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La politique européenne de la concurrence revisitée: 
les doctrines économiques dans le travail politique européen 
Résumé 
La  politique  de  la  concurrence  européenne  est  souvent  décrite  comme  néolibérale  sans 
véritable  investigation.  Cet  article  explique  comme  la  doctrine  de  la  politique  de  la 
concurrence européenne a été construite, et comment le mouvement ordolibéral et les idées 
de l’école de Chicago ont été implémenté et soutenues par le travail politique d’un certain 
nombre d’acteurs clés. Nous montrons que contrairement à ce qui est parfois dit dans la 
littérature, les acteurs ordolibéraux n’étaient ni leaders ni hégémoniques pendant la période 
qui va des négociations du Traité de Rome au début des années 1980, même si un certain 
nombre de principes néolibéraux furent introduits dans le droit de la concurrence. Ces règles 
apparaissent plus comme un compromis entre représentants français et allemands, et entre 
des positions néo-mercantilistes d’un côté et ordolibérales de l’autre. Cependant, les choses 
changèrent  fortement  à  partir  des  années  1980,  quand,  en  même  temps,  (1)  un  travail 
politique des membres de la Commission pour compléter le marché intérieur est relancé et 
(2) des décisions de la CJCE clarifièrent la doctrine du droit de la concurrence européen. 
Désormais, la politique de la concurrence européenne apparaît comme un mélange entre un 
esprit ordolibéral et des éléments doctrinaires issus de l’école de Chicago. 
Mots-clés  :  politique,  concurrence,  Union  Européenne,  néolibéralisme,  ordolibéralisme, 
travail politique. 
 
EU Competition Policy Revisited: 
Economic Doctrines Within European Political Work 
Abstract 
European Union competition policy is often described as neoliberal, without this leading to 
more investigation. This paper highlights how the European Competition policy doctrine has 
been  shaped,  how  the  ordoliberal  movement  and  the  Chicago  school  ideas  have  been 
implemented  and  supported  by  the  political  work  of  some  key  actors.  We  show  that, 
contrary to what is sometimes said in literature, ordoliberal actors were neither hegemonic 
nor leaders between Rome Treaty and the eighties, even if some neoliberal principles were 
introduced in antitrust law. These laws are much more a compromise between French and 
German representatives, and between neo-mercantilists and ordoliberals. However, things 
have  dramatically  changed  since  the  eighties,  when  both  (1)  new  political  work  from 
members  of the  Commission  introduced  in  the  European  competition  policy  elements  of 
Chicago School doctrine to complete the European market and (2) some decisions from the 
ECJ clarified the doctrine of EU Competition law. Nowadays, European competition policy is a 
mix between an ordoliberal spirit and some Chicago School doctrinal elements.   
Keywords:  competition,  policy,  European  Union,  neoliberalism,  ordoliberalism,  political 
work 
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The  European  Union’s  (EU)  competition  policy  is  clearly  trans-industry  because  it  applies 
horizontally  to  all  the  domains  of  economic  activity  within  this  territory.  Moreover,  as  existing 
research underlines (Wilks, 2005), a great deal of inter-firm competition in Europe has come to be 
governed at the scale of the EU. Indeed, this form of trans-industry regulation has constituted a 
central instrument in the institutionalization and the regulation of a single European market (Wigger, 
2007). 
However,  what  is  much  less  clear  is  the  role  played  by  economic  doctrines  in  this  highly 
important  political  process.  Many  accounts  of  EU  competition  policy  by  political  scientists 
concentrate upon the publicized clashes between ‘neo-liberal’ and ‘neo-mercantilist’ protagonists 
that  have  occurred  during  the  history  of  the  EU  (Cini  and  McGowan,  2009).  Some  historians 
meanwhile have underlined how ‘German ordoliberals’ were largely successful in transposing the 
principles of a ‘social market economy’ upon the European Communities in the 1950s and, in so 
doing, defeating the ‘planning’ variant of neo-mercantilism from interventionist France, Italy and 
Belgium (Gerber, 1998). Others, however, dispute this thesis strongly by arguing that ordoliberalist 
influence on EU competition law and policy is overstated (Ramirez Perez, 2007). 
Notwithstanding the quantity and quality of all this research, unfortunately much uncertainty 
and even confusion still remains over the precise ideological content of the economic doctrines used 
to build, legitimate and implement the EU’s competition policy throughout the whole of its history. 
Indeed, especially when analyzing developments since the mid 1980s, academic analysis has rarely 
attempted to fully unpack the doctrines concerned1. Moreover, much of this literature shares two 
problematical traits. 
First, authors have either neglected the politics of competition policy norms and rulings that 
occurs around the substance of competition policy, or reduced this politics to the formal intervention 
of politicians2. As we have underlined elsewhere, when studying economies it is more heuristic to 
define politics instead as ‘behaviour that is both discursive and interactive which seeks to change or 
reproduce institutions by mobilizing values’ (Jullien & Smith, 2011: 15). 
Second, and especially more recently, specialists of EU competition policy have frequently 
reduced explanation on change policy substance to ‘a rise in the use of economic analysis’ during 
decision-making (Wilks, 2007; Cini & McGowan, 2009). In so doing, however, precise knowledge has 
not been produced about what doctrines from economics this ‘rise’ has contained.  
Overall then, a black box still remains around the processes of ‘political work’ through which 
economic doctrines have been translated over the six decades of EU competition policy’s history into 
                                                      
1 Indeed, there is a contrast here with work on the development of US competition policy which emphasizes both the role of economic 
doctrine and representatives of firms (Fligstein, 1990 & 2001).  
2 For a typical example of this use of the term politics see Damro & Guay who reduce it to the intervention of politicians in debates over 
competition policy (2009: 2). For a critique of this trend see (Bush-Hansen & Wigger, 2009: 3 & 6-7). EU Competition Policy Revisited: Economic Doctrines Within European Political Work 
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the institutionalized policy instruments of today’s EU government of inter-firm competition. Through 
defining political work as a process that entails both the construction of industrial issues as ‘public 
problems’  (problematization)  and  their  legitimation  through  politicization or  depoliticization,  this 
concept guides empirical research to produce knowledge on the argumentation and alliance-building 
activity of the actors concerned (Jullien & Smith, 2008: chapter 1). Analyzing political work in this way 
thus provides a means of understanding the production of the ‘instruments’ (Lascoumes & Le Galès, 
2007) of the EU’s government of interfirm competition and, thereby, the ‘governmentality’ (Foucault, 
2004) it reflects and encapsulates. 
More specifically, written by an economist, a historian and a political scientist and using initial 
findings from their ongoing interdisciplinary research3, in this paper the concept of political work will 
be used to shed light upon the relationship between economic theory and doctrine on the one hand 
and  EU  competition  policy  on  the  other.  This  goal  is  sought  by  developing  and  defending  the 
following  claim:  the key debates over  this  policy have  not  only  been the much  publicized  ones 
between neo-mercantilists and neo-liberals (Kariagiannis, 2009). Rather since the beginnings of the 
EU  a  crucial  debate  over competition  policy  has  been  located within  neo-liberalism  itself. More 
precisely, ‘ordo-liberalism’ –a theory often mentioned but rarely analyzed- needs to be seen both as 
a theory of, and a doctrine for orienting, economic activity which is best understood as a distinctive 
strand of neo-liberal thought.  
The  first  part  of  this  paper  develops  and  explains  this  claim  whilst  highlighting  its 
consequences for studying the government of inter-firm competition in general. Three empirical 
illustrations  of  our  argument  then  follow,  each  of  which  retraces  key  episodes  from  the 
institutionalization of the EU’s government of inter-firm competition.  
Through re-examining the establishment of EC competition law between 1950-62, part 2 of the 
then paper underlines the impact of an initial cleavage between ordo-liberals and neo-mercantilists 
in the negotiations of the ECSC and EEC Treaties. In contrast to standard accounts of this founding 
period which claim an initial ‘victory’ for German ordo-liberals (Seidel, 2009); Quack & Djelic, 2005), 
we argue that the historical evidence points to a more complex and interesting relationship between 
economic doctrines and European-wide political work.  Indeed, our analysis of the effects of this 
interplay seeks instead not only to better explain the actual content of the general articles and 
regulations on competition adopted at this time, but also, and more fundamentally still, to grasp the 
causality  behind  the  limited  impact of  policy  towards  cartels  and  monopolies  developed  by  the 
European Communities during the subsequent period that extended until the mid 1980s. 
As is well known, the EU’s competition policy came to be fully activated in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. Here, however, the role played by economic doctrines has again tended to be treated in 
over-general  terms  –  this  time  by  invoking  a  ‘neo-liberal  victory’  over  neo-mercantilism  (Cini  & 
McGowan, 2009). In part 3 of this paper, we begin to set out a programme for research which argues 
instead for better analysis of the interaction between economic doctrine and European-wide political 
work that occurred during this period. More specifically, we defend a research perspective that 
better encompasses the arrival in pre-existing debates of a ‘new’ set of neo-liberals driven by the 
economic doctrines of ‘the Chicago school’. 
Finally, in order to bring this analysis up to the present day, social science needs to produce 
knowledge about how and why the EU’s competition policy has been reinstitutionalized since the 
turn of the century (part 4). Here it will be argued not only that the importance of neo-mercantilism 
                                                      
3 This paper is based partly on previous empirical investigations (Ramïrez-Përez, 2007; Joana & Smith, 2002; Smith, 2009). But it is also 
heavily informed by new work currently being carried out within a research project ‘Le gouvernement européen des industries’ (GEDI). The 
latter is funded by the French Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR). http://www. gedi.sciencespobordeaux.fr EU Competition Policy Revisited: Economic Doctrines Within European Political Work 
  5 
doctrine has steadily continued to decline. Instead, we go further in hypothesizing that the cause of 
change since 2000 is to be found in 1) a doctrinal victory by partisans of the Chicago approach to 
competition over  ordoliberal  thinkers  and  actors  and  2)  the  translation  of  this  victory  into  new 
instruments of EU governmentality. 
Overall, through highlighting the role played by struggles over economic doctrine, and thus 
within political work, during each of these periods, our aim is to reproblematize analysis of the 
institutionalization of the EU’s government of competition with a view to launching new research in 
this subject area and, thereby, producing wider and deeper knowledge about its politics.  
1. Studying the role of economic theory and doctrine within EU 
competition policy 
The EU’s competition policy of today is of course the cumulative result of a long process of 
compromise between actors claiming to represent interests of varying types. However, throughout 
these processes of interest interpretation and defence, inspiration has also been taken from theories 
and doctrines taken from the science of economics. Indeed, these doctrines have shaped the specific 
instruments of ‘governmentality’ (Foucault, 2004) which, in turn, have structured the practices of the 
EU’s policy in this area. 
Every economic policy, including that of competition, is generally founded upon one or several 
economic  doctrines  which  themselves  stem  from  economic  theories.  An  economic  theory  is  an 
abstract and simplified representation of how the economy functions that is structured around a set 
of  hypotheses.  Economic  theory  can  take  the  form  of  economic  models  which  are  a  specific 
formalisation  of  the  theory  that  is  based  upon  the  exogenous  and  endogenous  variables  and 
parameters contained in the model. Economic theory’s principal aim is heuristic in that it seeks to 
understand how an economy functions. In contrast, the aim of economic doctrines is normative 
because they seek to promote or favour a situation that is considered optimal from the point of view 
of social welfare, efficiency and/or social justice. Most often founded upon an economic theory, an 
economic doctrine is thus a rationality, but also a set of practices and rules designed to shape public 
intervention and economic policies.  
The strong ideological content of such doctrines and the objectives they seek to attain in the 
economy,  and  through  competition  policy  in  particular,  takes  its  first  effect  by  shaping  the 
government  of  inter-firm  competition  as  a  ‘public  problem’  and  guiding  the  design  of  policy 
instruments (laws, norms). Economic theory and doctrine also, and often simultaneously, can act as a 
means of legitimating the construction of problems and instruments. This takes place through their 
inscription within the two dimensions of what we call ‘political work’: the building of arguments and 
of actor-alliances (Jullien and Smith, 2008). 
Competition  policies  are  thus  heavily  structured  by  economic  doctrines.  However,  like  all 
economic policies, they are also the cumulative result of compromises between interests held by 
actors that are often in conflict or contradiction. Compromise-making frequently has the effect of 
creating a gap between policy and the doctrines and theories used during their formulation. Indeed, 
and  for  precisely  this  reason,  today’s  competition  policy of  the  EU  is  the  product  of  both  neo-
mercantilist  and  neo-liberal  economic  doctrines.  In  order  to  show  the  consequences  of  this 
perspective  for  research,  this  section  first  sets  out  the  general  objectives  and  interventions  of 
competition policy before proceeding to unpack how different economic theories have given rise to 
conflicting doctrines in this field. EU Competition Policy Revisited: Economic Doctrines Within European Political Work 
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1.1. The general aims and instruments of competition policy 
Any competition policy shares the following general objectives: 
- ensuring that the rules that govern the relationship between economic competitors are fair 
and equal; 
- protecting the consumer; 
- protecting the economic freedom of collective actors and individuals (firms and consumers); 
- encouraging economic efficiency. 
However, the hierarchy established between these objectives is the result of the doctrines 
mobilized and the negotiations that have taken place within the polity in question, as well as the 
rules that have progressively been institutionalized during this process. In particular, the extent to 
which the criteria of ‘economic efficiency’ has structured these rules correlates to the extent to 
which certain economic theories are explicitly referred to by competition authorities during decision-
making. 
The instruments of any competition policy essentially seek to control: 
- monopolies and the abuse of dominant positions; 
- cartels and other forms of inter-firm collusion; 
- vertical restrictions and discriminatory practices. 
As for the implementation of any competition policy, it can take several forms which vary 
around three variables. The first concerns the eligibility and the legitimacy of decision-makers. In 
certain cases, such as the EU, one or several competition agencies can take decisions leaving only a 
secondary role of judicial review to the courts and jurisprudence. In other cases, such as the US, the 
courts and jurisprudence have a more primary role. 
A  second  variable  concerns  the  dominant  logic  of  action.  Eligible  decision-makers  apply 
competition policy either according to the principle of written rules (per se) or according to the ‘rule 
of reason’. In the first of these instances, the competition authority punishes an infringement of the 
rule itself (eg. the forbidding of bundled sales), whereas in the second the authority analyzes the real 
or  potential  anti-competition  effects  of  the  incriminated  practice,  as  well  as  its  impact  upon 
efficiency (eg. by ascertaining whether restricted sales have an anti-competition effect, reduce the 
efficiency of the market or result in a loss of consumer well-being). 
A third variable concerns the procedures of decision-making. In the case of concentrations 
(mergers and joint ventures), competition policies can function through demanding firms to 1) make 
ex ante notifications and authorizations, 2) through ex post verifications, ie. regimes of legalized 
exceptions.  In  the  first  instance,  a  merger  is  considered  not  to  be  complete  until  the  relevant 
competition authority has validated it. In the second, the concentration will take place but remains 
under  threat  of  a  control.  In  the  third,  the  inter-firm  agreement  can  only  be  challenged  if  the 
competition authority decides to do so. This variation in procedures has numerous consequences. 
For  example,  regimes  of  legal  exemption  tend  strongly  to  increase  the  role  of  third  party 
complainants. More generally, each procedure tends to bias the burden of proof towards different 
protagonists and accord a varying role to the courts. 
The fourth variable concerns the hierarchy established between the different objectives of 
competition policy and its effects upon the relationship between its respective instruments and 
principles. For example, if monopolies are authorized so long as they improve economic efficiency 
and consumer welfare, the principles of per se rules and regimes of legalized exception tend to apply. EU Competition Policy Revisited: Economic Doctrines Within European Political Work 
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In summary, competition policy can and does take many forms. As a form of intervention in 
the  economy,  it  is  sometimes  seen  as  contradictory  with  liberal  economic  and  political  theory. 
However, the minute one looks more closely things become far more complex. As we set out below, 
the main reason for this is heterogeneity within neo-liberalism: although reasoning from the general 
precepts of liberal theory, and initially in opposition to neo-mercantilist economic theory, actually a 
range of liberal and neo-liberal doctrines have been developed. Indeed, particularly since the 1970s, 
these  tensions  and  conflicts  within  liberalism  itself  have  considerably  influenced  the  general 
development of competition policies. 
1.2. The initial doctrines behind competition policy: structuralism and the neo-
mercantilist/neo-liberal conflict 
Formalized competition policies began at the end of the 19
th century through the adoption in 
the US of the Sherman Act in 1890 and the Clayton Act a generation later in 1914. At that time, 
economic theory had yet to explore the issue of competition policy. Instead, politicized ‘objective 
necessities’, notably the ‘excessive’ power of large trusts (eg. that of John Rockerfeller’s Standard Oil 
or those of merchant bankers like J.P. Morgan), were transformed into public problems that fed into 
the  institutionalization  of  instruments  first  stabilized  in  the  Sherman  Act.  Very  soon  thereafter, 
however, economic theorists began to invest heavily in this field of study and public action. 
The  first  to  do  so  were  specialists  of  ‘imperfect  competition’  who  sought  to  grasp  its 
consequences. In this vein, ‘structuralists’ such as Mason and Bain gave birth to the paradigm of 
research known as ‘Structures-Conducts-Performances’ (SCP) which came to shape US competition 
policy for many years around one central tenet: market structures in general, and entry barriers and 
concentration  levels  in  particular,  determine  firm  behaviour  (and  thence  prices,  growth  and 
consumer welfare). From this starting point, structuralism gave rise to a competition policy doctrine 
that aimed to limit dominant positions because they were seen as causing upso facto abuse of 
competition  (Brandeis,  1934).  Consequently,  structuralism  as  a  doctrine  strongly  encouraged 
competition authorities to examine levels of competition (in terms of market share) and, through 
implementing per se rules, to forbid categories of practices (eg. monopolies or cartels) – all this in the 
name of the beneficial effects this outlawing was considered to procure. 
However, structuralist theory had its opponents. Indeed, historically the principal opposition in 
economic policy in general, and within competition  policy in particular, has been between neo-
mercantilists4 in favour of protectionism, state intervention and economic planning on the one hand 
and a range of neo-liberals on the other. Neo-mercantilists have never developed a genuine doctrine 
for competition policy as such. Rather they have argued in favour of industrial policy and the direct 
intervention  of  the  state  in  the  economy  as  a  substitute  for  competition5.  Similarly,  centralized 
planning was to be used in order to allocate resources with the aim of conserving the advantages of 
political  freedom  so  central  to  liberalism  whilst  avoiding  the  ‘anarchy’  of  free  markets.  Taking 
theoretical and practical nourishment from the mercantilism of the 16
th century and, in the French 
case from ‘Colbertisme’, consequently neo-mercantilists developed a form of governmentality based 
upon state action via sectoral industrial policies (eg. subsidies, nationalizations, encouraging ‘national 
champions’, price controls) (Jobert & Muller, 1987). In the 1930s, these doctrines also took support 
from certain socialist and conservative thinkers and actors. But what is important to underline is that 
the  reformalization of these  doctrines  at  this  time,  and  in  particular  the  importance  granted  to 
                                                      
4 This category of thinkers and actors is very wide as it includes those who are generally described as dirigistes or planners. Deeper analysis 
would obviously differentiate within neo-mercantilism. For our purposes here, however, they will be grouped together. 
5 Neomercantilism is of course much more a theory of co-operation and corporation. Here we reiterate the point made earlier where we 
recognize that it is reductive to categorize as neo-mercantilist all the proposals which derived, in one form or another, from the alternative 
models to the market economy which flourished in Europe throughout the 20th century (Maier, 1987). EU Competition Policy Revisited: Economic Doctrines Within European Political Work 
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competition policy, also took place through an opposition to changes and reformulations within 
liberalism itself. 
The genesis of neo-liberalism is an enormous subject that obviously extends way beyond the 
scope  of  this  paper.  What  is  important  to  grasp  when  looking  back  at  the  1930s  is  both  the 
continuing ideological power of liberalism, but also of its perceived ‘failure’ as a means of governing 
actual economies. Previously the political power of liberalism had always stemmed from an alliance 
of actors who basically agreed on the need to limit the role of government, the positive economic 
and political effects of price stability and international peace. However, as Denord relates in detail 
(2007), the depression of the 1930s led to a generalised perception that classical liberalism had 
‘failed’ and, therefore, that a new form of liberalism needed to be invented. For a range of reasons 
related to World War II, the neo-liberalism sketched out at the end of the 1930s only re-emerged 
politically in the form of doctrine during the late 1950s. What is important to underline for this paper 
is  not  only  that  three  forms  of  neo-liberalism  emerged  from  this  process,  but  also  that  each 
possessed its own approach to competition policy: 
- a ‘Chicago school’: first developed in the 1930s in opposition to Roosevelt’s planism; 
- ultraliberalism (later known as libertarianism): rooted in the neo-marginalist economics of 
the Austrians Von Mises and Von Hayek; 
- ordoliberalism: first developed within ‘the Freiburg school’ by authors such as Walter Eucken, 
Wihelm Röpke, Franz Böhm, Alfred Müller-Armack and Walter Rüstow. 
If  the  partisans  of  these  three  neoliberalisms  disagreed  over  several  important  points  of 
economic  doctrine,  they  shared  a  fundamental  opposition  to  neo-mercantilism.  In  particular, 
thinkers and actors from these three ‘schools’ all considered that planning and state intervention 
would always be incapable of replacing the market6. Instead, from the 1930s onwards within most 
liberal thought economic policy came to be seen as a method of government based upon knowledge 
of  the  practical  effects  of  certain  measures  upon  the  economy.  Self-limitation  on  governmental 
power was thus to be based upon a principal of truth –the truth as revealed not only by science but 
by markets through prices. For this reason, these neoliberals came to see their own theories and 
doctrines as an art of government based upon the market as a standard of truth7.  
Overall then, the debate begun in the 1930s between holders of renewed liberal doctrine and 
neo-mercantilists updated and extended a centuries-old cleavage between those who doubted the 
all-encompassing powers of government and those who believed that such powers were the key to 
greater social welfare. 
1.3. Debates within neoliberalism: the Austrians, the ordoliberals and the 
Chicago School 
Ever since the 1930s, developments within the discipline and practice of economics have had a 
strong impact upon the economic doctrines of three sets of neoliberal thinkers and actors. Within 
this intra-neoliberal debate, doctrines on competition policy have often been at the forefront. 
                                                      
6 And this because the planner could never hold all the information necessary to run an economy effectively, whereas free markets allowed 
preferences  and  knowledge  to  be  expressed  via  prices.  More  fundamentally  still,  as  Foucault  underlined  (2004),  liberalism  is  a 
governmental rationality which came into being as a reaction to mercantilism. Whereas the economic policy of the latter was ‘an art of 
government’ founded on maximizing the wealth and the power of the sovereign through state  intervention, liberal  economic policy 
emerged as a means of self-limiting governmental power through law and other policy instruments. 
7 Significantly for this paper, and as Foucault also underlined (2004), neoliberals considered that this form of government should also 
extend to international relations through the principles underlying cross-border trade. Here balance between the nation states of Europe 
was seen as being best achieved by encouraging free competition and avoiding the protectionism of mercantilists. Whereas the latter saw 
international trade either as a zero-sum game or even as having negative impacts upon both domestic wealth and international peace, 
liberals saw free trade as contributing to stability between nations. EU Competition Policy Revisited: Economic Doctrines Within European Political Work 
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1.3.1 The Austrian School: an ultraliberal competition doctrine 
If  authors  such  as  Von  Mises  and  Von  Hayek  have  always  refused  the  name  neo-liberal 
(considering themselves to be the descendants of ‘naturalist’ liberalism), the latter in particular is 
seen as its ‘patriarch’ (Denord, 2007: 297). Their approach sees markets as spontaneous orders 
produced over time by a process of learning and selection strongly linked to competition which 
eliminates ‘inefficient’ institutions and reveals relevant knowledge to economic actors. Put another 
way, according to this theory, markets are always in a state of disequilibrium within which inter-firm 
competition obliges their respective agents to find new knowledge and thence to innovate. It follows 
that for such authors all public intervention in the economy is criticized because the ‘constructed 
order’ it creates is based on the premise that public authorities are able to marshal all the relevant 
information  when  making  their  decisions.  Instead,  for  authors  like  Hayek  a  market  economy  is 
complex and certain knowledge and information can only come to light through the spontaneous 
processes  linked  to  competition  and  the  existence  of  free  prices.  For  this  reason,  this  school 
conceptualizes entrepreneurs as a general category of economic actors all seeking profits within a 
world that is uncertain and constantly changing. Indeed, the latter are seen very positively as the 
explorers of new productive options and as creators (Kirzner, 1997). The ventures and errors that 
mark  this  process  favour  exploration  and  the  discovery  of  new  knowledge  and  attempts  to 
equilibrate the market, often through seeking monopolies which, however, will always be temporary. 
Schumpeterien and evolutionist economics extends this approach to competition by underlining the 
positive role in the economy played by entrepreneurs and by innovation. Indeed, according to this 
theory, entrepreneurs conduct innovation in the hopes of gaining temporary monopolies. 
The consequence of this theory for the doctrine of competition policy is that monopolies per 
se are not condemned firstly because they constitute a reward to entrepreneurs for innovation and, 
secondly, because their temporary nature results from their generation of follower firms who will 
eventually challenge the dominant competitors. More generally, this theory incites the complete 
absence of economic policies, including in the field of competition, in the name of pure laissez faire. 
If  this  approach  indirectly  maintained  a  certain  degree  of  vitality  through  its  influencing  of  the 
Chicago school (see below), its influence upon the actual government of inter-firm competition has 
been even less direct (particularly in the EU). 
1.3.2 Ordoliberalism: a competition doctrine designed to build ‘social market economies’ 
In contrast to the Austrian school, over the last sixty years ordoliberalism –a clearly declared 
neo-liberalism  that  breaks  with  naturalist  liberalism-  has  influenced  this  field  of  EU  government 
considerably. The specific argument consistently made by ordoliberals has been that the market and 
competition are not natural, just as free and unfettered competition is not a spontaneous social fact. 
Instead, pure competition must be produced by an active form of governmentality: one must govern 
for the market not by the market. Consequently, the state must institutionalize competition through 
the  establishment  of  rules  and  institutions  and,  in  particular,  the  outlawing  of  cartels  and 
monopolies. Whilst contesting the argument that competition always leads to monopolies, the aim 
of the holders of this approach is to establish and maintain a situation of permanent competition. 
Indeed, their ideal is an economy of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) with no monopolies 
or  cartels.  Indeed,  from this  starting  point, according  to  Foucault  (2004)  ordoliberals wanted  to 
establish a societal rather than an economic policy in order to ensure that each segment of society –
whose  overall  aim  was  freedom  and  order-  would  be  subject  to  the  principle  of  competition. 
Crucially, above all competition and economic freedom thus had to be protected – consumer welfare 
being  only  a  secondary  consequence  of  fair  and  free  competition.  Moreover,  according  to  the 
ordoliberals, all the above was to be achieved via the actions of the state.  EU Competition Policy Revisited: Economic Doctrines Within European Political Work 
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Indeed,  in  order  to  attain  the  above-mentioned  goals,  ordoliberalism  proclaimed  that  an 
economic constitution had to be institutionalized which would define ‘the social market economy’8 
through  which  the  economic  rights  of  individuals  would  be  protected  and  guaranteed.  More 
precisely,  one of  the  key  constituting  principles  of  this  approach  was  ‘safeguarding  free  market 
access and free competition, a duty to be accorded to an autonomous authority for controlling 
monopolies and cartels’. According to Bilger (2005: 4), this dovetailed with a horizontal principle 
‘according to which every measure of economic and social policy had to satisfy the criteria of being in 
conformity with the logic of the economic system in order to avoid all the incoherencies of public 
intervention which generally cause such a system to dysfunction’. 
Theoretically  ordoliberalism  makes  a  strong  distinction  between  the  framework  and  the 
process of economic policy – a distinction which in terms of doctrine translates into a different status 
being accorded to ‘ordering’ policies on the one hand and, on the other, to ‘regulatory’ policies such 
as  that  of  competition.  The  latter  category  was  supposed  to  be  established  only  when  they 
conformed with the constitutional principles of ordoliberalism and when structured by rigorous legal 
rules which would prevent public authority intervening in any way other than that indicated by the 
market and the principle of economic freedom. Indeed, for ordoliberals price was the best criteria 
upon which to base the regulation of markets. Consequently, competition has to be fair and free 
from  all  distortions  caused  by  state  interventions.  As  with  structuralism,  the  first  generation  of 
ordoliberalism had a strong dislike of cartels and monopolies. Moreover, it was strongly in favour of 
per  se  rules  and  ex  ante  authorisations.  Indeed,  to  adopt  a  helpful  distinction  developed  by 
Schweitzer (2007, 18), ordoliberals were committed to forbidding not only the ‘exploitative abuse’ of 
competition but also all forms of ‘exclusionary abuse’. 
1.3.3 The Chicago School: a neo-classical critique of structuralist competition policy 
If, as we shall in Parts 2 and 3, if ordoliberalism played an important role in forging both the 
competition  policies  of  West  Germany  and  the  European  Communities,  in  worldwide  terms  the 
largest sources of inspiration for doctrines within this policy area are located within the different 
neo-classical approaches to economics. The latter is of course vast and first needs unpacking into at 
least three strands that are briefly sketched below in chronological order. 
The first to emerge was an approach known as ‘Law and Economics’. Developed mainly by 
academics at the University of Chicago, at least two periods of work can be distinguished. In the 
1930s a sustained critique of the planism of the Roosevelt presidencies was developed. Much of this 
critique also attacked the structuralist approach to competition policy that at the time was being 
argued for by various economists and lawyers at Havard (eg. Brandeis, 1934) (Wigger, 2008). But 
Chicago  is  even  better  known  for  a  second  wave  of  publications  and  political  work  around 
competition policy developed in the 1970s by economists such as Posner (1976) and Bork (1978). 
According to this perspective, if monopolies exist this is because they are either ‘natural’ (because 
their greater efficiency has legitimately eliminated their inefficient rivals), or because the state has 
protected  them.  For  this  reason,  antitrust  laws  are  only  seen  as  necessary  in  certain  instances. 
However,  in  the  main  this  approach  strongly  claims  that  policies  aimed  at  establishing  ‘pure’ 
competition are not efficient. Consequently rules that are too general should be avoided in favour of 
more pragmatic ‘rules of reason’. Indeed, the antidote proposed by the Chicago school has been to 
incite competition authorities to analyze efficiency within markets, and this by using neo-classical 
economic theory in order to determine whether the behaviour of firms is anti-competition or not. To 
return to Schweitzer’s distinction, this approach urges competition authorities to discard the concept 
                                                      
8 This term was invented by Alfred Müller-Armack, not only an ordoliberal economist but also one of the main advisors of W. Eucken and, 
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of  ‘exclusionary  abuse’  of  competition  in  favour  of  the  discovery  and  outlawing  of  ‘exploitative 
abuse’ (2007, 18). 
A  second  neo-classical  approach  developed  by  Williamson  (1975)  around  the  concept  of 
‘transaction  costs’  also  provided  a  set  of  criticisms  of  state  intervention  in  the  regulation  of 
competition.  According  to  this  theory,  ‘hybrid’  forms  of  economic  activity  (cartels,  vertical 
restrictions, alliances etc.) emerge because they are efficient means of reducing transaction costs. 
The  theory  therefore  concluded  that  forbidding  them  ran  counter  to  the  quest  for  an  efficient 
economy. 
Finally, the most recent neo-classical approach developed is that of ‘industrial organization’. 
Using the computerized mathematical models and game theory that both began to be formalized in 
the late 1970s and 1980s (Baumol, Panzar & Willig, 1982; Tirole, 1988), this approach sets out to 
detect imperfect competition by predicting how markets will operate under different scenari (Lyons, 
2008). At the heart of the approach is a concern for the efficiency of rules and tariffs. In general, the 
approach postulates first that if a market is competitive, and even if pure competition is not in place, 
the market is still efficient9; second, that rules tend to create barriers to entry10; and third that 
competition policies are often inefficient.  
When applied to specific cases of competition, market efficiency is measured here either in 
terms of Pareto optimality or using criteria such as consumer, producer or global surpluses. Firstly, 
neither of these methodologies leads necessarily to the condemnation of monopolies so long as new 
entrants are not discouraged. Secondly, collusions and cartels are not always to be forbidden either. 
Using the theory of non-co-operative games, this approach shows that tacit collusions can be just as 
important in certain markets and that, therefore, outlawing all collusion is very difficult to achieve. 
Thirdly, when applied to the issue of mergers, this approach argues that it is very difficult to predict 
in advance the favourable effects of such operations in general, and their potential synergies in 
particular. Finally, price discrimination and sales restrictions are not necessarily seen as inefficient 
and illegitimate. 
Overall, therefore, developments within neo-classical economics has progressively produced a 
‘post Chicago’ consensus which concludes 1) that competition policy should not be used to outlaw 
many economic practices that other theories, and notably ordoliberalism, would have automatically 
forbidden; and 2) that nevertheless competition policy still has an important role to play in certain 
types of cases so long as their adjudication is made on the basis of ‘economic’ analysis studied in 
terms of efficiency and consumer welfare. On this basis, as Bruce Lyons, a British economist and 
participant in this movement, forcefully concludes, not only has ‘a transatlantic consensus’ been 
achieved between most economists who ‘draw essentially on the same toolkit’, but ‘a new sub-
discipline of competition economics, much more nuanced to legal ideas and practical policy, has 
emerged’ (Lyons, 2008: 7-8) 
In summary, this section has begun to problematize the development of competition policies 
throughout the world as occurring alongside developments within the science of economics. Indeed, 
as table 1 highlights, the latter process has entailed a great deal of division and conflict which has 
frequently spilled over into the decision-making arenas of competition policy. In the following parts 
of this paper, we seek to follow the intertwined nature of academic and practitioner debates by 
retracing its impact upon key developments in the EU’s competition policy. In so doing, particular 
attention will be paid to 1) the actors and actor-coalitions who have ‘carried’ economic theories and 
                                                      
9 Note the similarity here with the theory of the Austrian school (Kirzner, 1997). 
10 Here Stigler’s theory of ‘regulatory capture’ (1971) sought to show that inefficient monopolies were often the production of state 
intervention. EU Competition Policy Revisited: Economic Doctrines Within European Political Work 
  12 
doctrines into EU debates or negotiations; and 2) the instruments of regulation that have been put in 
place and institutionalized as a result of the compromises this process has entailed. 
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2. Economic Doctrine and political work during the establishment of 
EC competition policy: Ordoliberalism vs Neo-mercantilism (1950-
1969) 
As has been widely documented, the initial institutionalisation of the principle of competition 
as organiser of the economic life of European-wide capitalism took place in the period after World 
War Two. However, it was the crisis of laissez-faire Liberalism in the 1930s and the perceived threat 
of state planning (be it socialist or fascist) which fundamentally provided the ideological debate 
within which competition policy became a central plank for the renewal of Liberalism (Denord, 2007; 
Dardot & Laval, 2009). Problematizations of this crisis first impacted upon the governmentality of the 
new state of West Germany and then upon proposals for the invention of a European-wide scale of 
competition regulation. 
Most  recent  research  has  credited  a  particular  strand  of  Neo-liberalism  -German  Ordo-
Liberalism-  as  being  the  main  intellectual  and  political  force  behind  the  institutionalisation  of 
competition  policy  at  the  European  scale  (Commun,  2003;  Wegmann,  2002;  Kolowski,  2000)  In 
particular, this research shows that at this time Walter Eucken and his Freibourg School had carried 
out  the  most  important  academic  research  on  competition  law  and  policy  from  both  legal  and 
economic perspectives. It also shows that the central role of a theory economic development based 
on  a  state  designed  to  ensure  competition  only  became  dominant  after  1945  because  of  the 
appointment of Ludwig Erhard as Minister of Economic Affairs in Bavaria, and from 1949 of the 
whole of West Germany. Erhard’s major adviser was Alfred Müller-Armack, Professor of Economics 
and Cultural Sociology at the Universities of Münster and Cologne. This catholic (and former member 
of the Nazi Party since 1933) devized in 1946 the concept of Sozialen Marktwirtschaft (social market 
economy) which came to act as the cornerstone of a political and intellectual movement. In 1953, 
the latter took the form of a network (Community of Action on behalf of the social market economy) 
with a strong foothold in the West German governement (Müller-Armack had just been appointed 
head  of  the  new  planning  office  (Grundsatzabteilung).  At  that  time  Müller-Armack  had  already 
developed an important set of reflections about why competition had to rule all social and human 
relations putting the market at the service of free citizens. (Ptak, 2004). These reflections were then 
made to have political effects through the adoption of ‘the social market economy’ as a central 
objective of the new party which was to rule West Germany for most of post-war period: the CDU. 
Other recent historical research, however, has also contributed to a myth that a European-
wide institutionalisation of competition policy was the most important long-term political victory by 
German Ordo-liberals over French planers and neo-mercantilists (Gillingham, 2003). According to 
what has become a dominant academic and actor narrative, an Ordo-liberal network (headed within 
the EEC by the long-serving German Commissioner -Hans von der Groeben- his head of cabinet, Ernst 
Albrecht, and legal adviser Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker-),(Von der Groeben, 1987; Von der Groeben, 
1995; Von der Groeben, 2002) managed to make inter-firm competition (Wettbewerbsordnung) into 
the pivot around which the European Communities were institutionalized and its member states 
transformed.  In  short,  according  to  this  narrative  Ordo-liberalism  transposed  West  Germany’s 
Ordnungspolitik into the de facto economic constitution for European integration (Gerber, 1998).. 
Like all inventions of tradition, the myth of an European competition policy exclusively shaped 
and directed by ‘the European Pilgrims of Liberty’ has been widely exaggerated – not only by ‘the 
Founding Fathers’, but also by their ideological followers and disciples within the discipline of law 
(Mestmäcker & alii, 1986; Hrbek, R. & Schwarz, 1998) Just as significantly, this myth is increasingly 
uncritically accepted by a large number of economists, political scientists (Quack & Djelic, 2005) and, 
more recently, historians (Leucht & Seidel, 2008, Leucht, 2009; Seidel, 2009; Denord & Schwartz, EU Competition Policy Revisited: Economic Doctrines Within European Political Work 
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2009; Dardot & Laval, 2009). n order to challenge this mythical version of EU history in general, and 
that of competition policy in particular, in this section we map the organizations, stakeholders and 
dominant actors who actually shaped EU competition law and policy at crucial moments between 
1945 and 1984. In so doing we show that EC competition law and policy was not simply the victory of 
a transnational cabal directed by German intellectuals turned into policy-makers. On the contrary, 
law and policy stemmed instead from a failure of both the original proposals of the ordoliberals and 
of their effects upon firm and national government behaviour. 
2.1. Competition and the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community 
2.1.1. An antitrust policy-network inspired by the USA’s example?  
The dominant interpretation of German ordo-liberalism as the cradle of competition policy in 
Europe  builds  upon  a  previous  historiographical  myth:  that  European  post-war  recovery  and 
subsequent economic growth was to a great extent the result of the post 1945 “Americanisation” of 
Europe. After several decades of debate, this hypothesis has been seriously reviewed, and even the 
most ardent tenants of the Americanisation hypothesis no longer attribute to American international 
policies  and  business  transfers  all  the  credit  for  the  “catching  up”  of  European  countries. 
(Eichengreen, 2007)11 However, in the field of the introduction of competition law in Europe, the 
prevalent view is still that this was part of the institutions which were imported into Europe from the 
other side of the Atlantic.  
To supporters of this thesis, the most evident channel of such influence was Germany, where 
the USA as dominant occupying power had as official policy the decartelisation and deconcentration 
of large trusts (Konzerne), mainly steel-coal holdings – and this as a means to control the future 
rearmament of  Germany (Gillingham, 1991).  Indeed,  from the  beginning  of 1948  the  Americans 
pushed  to  introduce  competition  law  in  Germany  in  order  to  ensure  the  continuity  of  the 
deconcentration of German industry. However, this draft bill, the Josten draft, which like in the US 
tradition introduced a total ban on cartels, was never approved nonetheless because Erhard opposed 
it. (Berghahn, 1986) Moreover, it was not until 1957, when the Treaty of Rome had already been 
negotiated,  that this  first  German  anti-trust  law  came to  be  enacted  through  the  Gesetz  gegen 
Wettbewerbeschränkungen (GWB) (Marburg, 1964; Voigt, 1962). 
Notwithstanding this evident ‘failure’, the most recent historical research has argued that the 
anti-trust articles of the Treaty of Paris were the result of a transatlantic policy network made up of 
academics, civil servants and statesmen, wherein the legal traditions of American anti-trust and 
Ordo-liberalism  converged.  (Leucht,  2009)  It  is  important  that  we  take  this  hypothesis  seriously 
because  it  claims  that  there  has  been  a  strong  path-dependence  and  continuity  in  European 
competition law and policy for more than half a century. The evidence highlighted by these historians 
was that some prominent actors of the German negotiation team of the Treaty of Paris were legal 
advisers to its head: Professor Walter Hallstein.  These advisors were Professors Hermann Mosler, 
Hans-Jürgen Schlochauer and Carl Friedrich Ophüls, all of whom had been involved in academic- 
Georgetown University- and Marshall Plan exchanges to introduce laws safeguarding competition in 
Germany.  
First of all, it is difficult to argue that Ordo-liberals were at the origin of articles 65 (anti-cartel) 
and 66 (anti-monopole) of the Treaty of Paris, because it was not from the German delegation which 
came  the  request  to  introduce  these  articles,  but  from  the  French  delegation  headed  by  the 
proponent of the Schuman Plan, Jean Monnet. A possibility to surmount this inconvenient evidence 
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is to argue that Jean Monnet was also part of this precocious anti-trust German-French network 
originated and mediated by the American diplomatic and academic establishment due to his well-
known US contacts. In this line, tenants of the Americanisation hypothesis have argued that the 
holders of ‘the magic recipe of antitrust’ to Monnet were the American embassy in Paris and all its 
European network through the Marshall Plan administration, more particularly the Law Professor 
from Harvard, Robert Bowie, member of the American occupation authority of Germany, who would 
have drafted the suggested articles. 
However, the problem with this vision of Monnet supposedly having an American anti-trust 
culture is that in the draft of the Schuman Plan declaration that he had prepared there was already a 
very vague mention of cartels which stated that the ECSC did not want to become an international 
cartel. Jean Monnet only came with a draft of anti-trust articles four months after the declaration of 
9
th May 1950, thus shedding considerable doubt upon this interpretation. If the Americans were 
indeed informed of events and even if Bowie have been involved in the drafting of these  articles on 
competition, the question remains as to why the French delegation would have accepted as early as 
27
th October 1950 to become the voice of an anti-trust tradition which was not its own?  
For  the  tenants  of  the  Americanisation  hypothesis,  Monnet  was  an  admirer  of  New  Deal 
legislation and from his position of Commissioner of Planning in France had attempted to introduce 
at  the  beginning  of  1949  an  anti-trust  bill  inspired  by  American  anti-trust  law  (Kipping,  2002). 
Historians have yet to find its first draft but Monnet himself mentioned in his memoirs that he looked 
for the advice to introduce anti-trust articles from Paul Reuter (Monnet, 1976).12 This Christian-
Democrat Lawyer had worked in the cabinet of Pierre-Henri Teitgen and was at the time the legal 
adviser of  the Quai  d’Orsay  directed  by  Robert  Schuman,  that  is,  not  really  a  representative  of 
American anti-trust tradition (Cohen, 1998). 
In  any  case,  if  there  was  a  French  political  thrust  towards  anti-trust  clauses  at  the 
supranational  scale,  they  were  not  linked  at  all  to  Ordo-liberalism  or  the  USA,  but  to  French 
Socialism. The first prominent politician who requested the French government to introduce anti-
trust legislation to fight against price-fixing was the left-wing Socialist Albert Gazier in a resolution of 
December 1948 in the Economic Affairs Commission of the French National Assembly. Moreover, it 
was a French Socialist like André Philip, former president of the Socialist Movement for the United 
States of Europe and former Minister of Economy and Finances until the end of 1947, the pioneer in 
asking anti-trust at European level.  He did so during the preparation of the Economic Conference of 
the European Movement held in Westminster in 1949, where he defended the creation of an anti-
cartel law for basic industries like steel and simultaneously an authority in charge of implementing it. 
Indeed, only a few months before the Schuman Plan negotiations, Philip was the only French policy-
maker who had publicly favoured a European Steel Authority in charge of applying an European anti-
cartel law, and this because he considered the working groups of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation in Europe would be incapable of preventing the restoration of the international steel 
cartel of the interwar period 13(Kipping, 2002).. 
As it is very difficult to evaluate the actual impact of these antecedents in the introduction of 
antitrust articles in the negotiations of the ECSC, most historians agree that the new French proposal 
for these articles was directly linked to a perceived national interest which had led, two months 
earlier, to a decision taken jointly by the Americans and the French to issue a regulation in occupied 
Germany to deconcentrate German steel trusts (Griffiths, 1998). Consequently, the ECSC’s articles on 
competition were shaped more by a politically-worked construction of French national interests than 
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by any German Ordo-liberal influence, previous ‘failures’s of anti-trust activity in Germany or France, 
or due to American traditions of Anti-trust. 
2.1.2. Articles 60-61 of the Paris Treaty: Constructed national economic interests more 
than Ordoliberal ideology 
The two anti-trust articles presented by Monnet on 27
th October 1950 to the delegations of 
the Six were aimed at nothing less than the banning of cartels (article 60 in the original numbering) 
and the establishment of merger control (article 61). It is true that the Americans, more precisely 
Bowie and the US Department of the State, had the opportunity to check them before their official 
presentation and agreed with them. Both articles, however, went much further than the American 
requests of avoiding price-fixing. In article 60, the French suggested a total ban on cartels, defined as 
all  agreements  and  practices  that  hindered  free  competition  including  price  fixing,  production 
quotas, and the partition of markets, products, customers or material resources.14 Article 61 was 
even more innovative because it introduced merger controls by the High Authority of the ECSC. This 
article aimed to counter all agreements or practices aiming at securing a market-dominating position 
for  one  enterprise,  including  the  concentration  of  firms.  More  precisely  all  mergers  had  to  be 
authorised by the High Authority on the basis of contributing to the general interest of the economy, 
which in practice would have meant that it was not bound to any condition to take its decisions, even 
if a control of more than 20% of the coal and steel market by a single legal entity was forbidden. To 
implement this interdiction the High Commission of the ECSC would have large powers to declare 
and terminate these agreements or practices with the use of penalty fees.  
As these articles went much further in a sense of political intervention in economic sectors 
than the US anti-trust, we can conclude that the French position was not simply the one pushed for 
by the Americans. More definitive about the real thrust behind these articles are the note of 20
th 
November  and  some  letters  exchanged  between  Schuman  and  Monnet  which  confirm  that  the 
French  introduced  the  merger  article  in  order  to  pursue  the  deconcentration  of  the  Rhur  steel 
industry  initiated  by  the  occupying  authorities  of  Germany  (Witschke,  2001;  Witschke,  2003; 
Witschke, 2009) 
The Ordo-liberal spirit was however definitively present elsewhere than in the negotiations 
because a German internal proposal of 21
st October 1950 did not favour the banning cartels as such, 
but made their approval depending on the High Authority, showing that the French proposal was 
more ambitious than what the Germans could tolerate (Schulze & Hoeren, 2000). Moreover, Erhard 
did not support tackling monopolies and, instead, defended the viewpoint of large companies that 
would be affected by the parallel process of German deconcentration and the anti-trust provisions 
for the coal and steel treaty. Whereas the Italian and the Dutch delegations supported the French, 
the German, Luxembourgian and Belgian delegations contested both the general ban on cartels and 
the attempts to put under control mergers with previous authorisations. According to American 
sources, ‘Belgium’ and ‘Luxembourg’ feared that this clause would affect the economic freedom of 
their respective steel and coal holdings, the Société Général de Belgique and the ARBED (Witschke, 
2001). 
Finally, after some important negotiations with the other Five, on 7
th December, again the 
French suggested the final drafts which were ultimately approved with minor modifications in the 
Treaty of Paris as articles 65 and 66. Whereas article 65 confirmed a total ban of cartels, the High 
Authority retained the right to authorise some precise agreements in very precise and restrictive 
circumstances, article 66 gave the High Authority the capacity to authorise a priori all mergers. More 
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interesting was article 67 which allowed members states to make exceptions in period of economic 
crises, opening the door for a public-private management of these two central industrial sectors. As 
we saw earlier, and will appreciate, later, these were not at all clauses which could be acceptable, 
not to say a reference, for German ordo-liberals, given the strong, decisive interventionist power on 
crucial industrial sectors awarded to a political authority like the future High Authority, which was to 
be chaired by Jean Monnet in person. 
Summing up, this section has demonstrated that the inclusion in the negotiations of the ECSC 
Treaty of antitrust articles to be applied to European steel and coal industries did not derive from any 
previous antecedent coming from Germany or the US, nor from an ordo-liberal network. Instead, 
these clauses resulted from the political work carried out by representatives of each member state 
armed with perceptions of their respective national interests. These actors included representatives 
of Erhard’s ‘Social Market Economy Germany’ who also defended the position of their steel and coal 
industries  as  ‘strategic’  for  the  general  economic  development  of  their  national  economy.  In 
contrast, there is no substantial evidence to supports pleas in favour of path dependent causation 
between previous attempts to create general anti-trust laws in France and Germany and articles 65 
and 66 of the actual ECSC treaty. 
2.2. The institutionalisation of competition principles in the Treaty of Rome 
Between the ECSC Treaty and the Treaty of Rome the question of institutionalising competition 
became salient not only within the ECSC system in charge of implementing articles 65 and 66 but also 
within each of its major member states. It is important to briefly review the steps taken by each 
country  towards  creating  national  anti-trust  provision  because  when  the  Messina  negotiations  -
which  ultimately  gave  birth  to  the  EEC-  started  in  1955,  there  were  already  several 
institutionalisations of the principle of competition in some ECSC member states (France, Germany 
and the Netherlands), whereas in others (Belgium, Italy and Luxembourg) there was not This point is 
of  fundamental  importance  to  understanding  national  positions,  ideological  traditions  and  the 
perceived  economic  impact  of  an  European  anti-trust  regulation  during  the  negotiations  that 
produced the Treaty of Rome. This was largely because a fundamental issue surfaced during these 
negotiations:  whether  the  countries  without  any  anti-trust  law  would  have  to  regulate  their 
respective economies using the principles set down in the forthcoming Treaty? 
2.2.1 Negotiating competition principles from Messina to Val Duchesse 
The  introduction  of  competition  policy  within  the  Treaty  of  Rome  became  from  the  very 
beginning a demand of the German delegation in the 1955 Messina negotiations- and this using the 
argument that it was not possible to guarantee a Common Market without rules on competition.15 
The head of the German delegation was Hallstein, seconded by the German representative in the 
drafting of the Spaak report, the ordo-liberal, Hans von der Groeben, (in charge of following the ECSC 
in Erhard’s ministry of the Economy). Along with the French Socialist Pierre Uri, von der Groeben 
became one of the two hands charged with drafting the Spaak report (the draft Treaty for the 
negotiations in Val Duchesse). The synthesis worked out by Uri and von der Groeben was more 
marked by their experience of the failure of the ECSC’s anti-trust measures as Pierre Uri was from the 
very  beginning  of  the  ECSC  it  director  of  its  section  of  Economic  Analysis  and  the  German 
represented its country in the Council of the ECSC.16 
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Chapter III of the Spaak report on “Monopolies” suggested that the simple removal of barriers 
would  not  permit  an  end  to  the  national  discriminations  between  companies,  particularly  in 
relationship to prices. If national barriers were substituted by private cartels between industrialists, 
they  could  create  positions  of  monopoly  which  would  eliminate  the  potential  gains  from  the 
common  market.  For  this  reason  the  competition articles  were  to  be  put  to  the  service  of  the 
construction of the common market by sanctioning at least three precise situations of monopoly 
(market sharing, production quotas, monopolistic domination). The institutional structure suggested 
was clearly a vibrant hymn to technocratic supra-nationalism. The Nation-States would not have any 
word  in  such  policies  whose  concrete  rules  derived  from  the  articles  of  the  Treaty  would  be 
elaborated by the European Commission, who would also decide and control only supervised by the 
European Assembly (EA) in the rules and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in case of appeal of a 
decision.  As  the  workload  was  forecast  to  be  very  important,  the  Spaak  report  included  two 
technocratic  agencies:  on  the  one  hand  the  Commission  would  be  flanked  by  a  Consultative 
Committee  with  a  role  of  arbitration  and  conciliation,  meanwhile  the  Court  would  create  a 
specialised chamber made of lawyers, economists and technicians. If this was not enough, the report 
pointed out that the first to be affected by the rules would be state-owned enterprises, opening the 
path  to  a  more  flexible  application  to  private  companies,  which  would  be  given  a  time  of 
adaptation.17  
We can conclude that the proposals in the Spaak report largely constituted a ‘perfect’ ordo-
liberal  model  of  European  anti-trust  law.  Actors  such  as  Von  der  Groeben,  who  had  personally 
drafted  these  clauses,  thus  had  high  hopes  that  the  national  governments  would  start  the 
negotiations leading to the Rome Treaty on this basis. Suffice to say at this point that these proposals 
did not coincide at all with the final shape that the member states signed in the Treaty of Rome. 
Indeed, analyzing the debate which took place during the negotiation of the Treaty of Rome allows 
one to reconstitute the preferences of each country in relationship to the kind of competition articles 
their representations desired. The three central questions at issue were cartels, monopolies and the 
institutional  framework  in  charge  of  competition  policy.  Other  important  issues  concerned  the 
application of competition rules to State monopolies and public services. 
2.2.2. From Val Duchesse to Rome 
What  was  the  German  ordo-liberal  proposal  negotiated  by  von  der  Groeben  and  Müller-
Armack in Val Duchesse? The basis was the writing of two articles: one for cartels and other for 
monopolies. The first included a general prohibition with very limited exceptions, meanwhile for the 
second the Treaty would only sanction the abuse of dominant position, either by a private company 
or a state undertaking. The most striking of the German suggestions was that they preferred to deal 
with the institutional structure in a separate Treaty to be drafted by the member states within two 
years or, if not, one year later the Commission would suggest a regulation to the Council, which 
would decide upon it by qualified majority. This lack of definition may have derived from the need to 
wait until the definitive approval of the German anti-trust law, which set up a special independent 
authority. In addition, Müller Armack was very clear in giving to the European Court of Justice the 
responsibility for reviewing cases and ruling upon them18.  
The French delegation, instead, worked politically to put the Council of Ministers in control of 
the decisions for competition. According to this plan, the Commission would be in charge of the 
actual surveillance of the system through the harmonisation of national legislations, which would 
continue to be fully operational given that the articles concerned only when the cartel or monopoly 
included more than just one country, and they would not be directly applicable by Member States. 
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To avoid paralysis of the system, the Council would decide on these issues by qualified majority. 
Coming to the concrete content of the article on competition, the French pleaded for a single article 
banning both cartels and monopolies with special emphasis on price fixing, the restriction or control 
of production, the partitioning of markets, and the total or partial domination of markets for certain 
products by a firm or groups of firms. This general prohibition was, however, derogated by a general 
exemption  articulated  in  three  cases:  that  cartels  and  monopolies  led  to  the  improvement  of 
production or distribution; that they foster technological or economic progress; and lastly, that they 
were carried out by state monopolies and public services.19 This position of the French delegation 
was  to  a  certain  extent  influenced  by  its  own  domestic  law  (the  idea  of  making  the  European 
Commission just a technical instrument was similar to its own Commission for cartels). Meanwhile 
political  decision-making  was  to  be  returned  to  national  governments  which  would  have  strong 
leeway to decide on exemptions. 
In contrast, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands were favourable to the European Commission 
as the responsible of the harmonisation of national competition laws, and this without waiting three 
years due to the insecurity that this project was creating among their business circles. However the 
two countries without competition laws, Italy and Belgium, diverged in relationship to the general 
ban of monopolies. Like on many other future occasions, the Mediterranean country joined France 
arguing that throughout the long transition period, the existence of national monopolies would harm 
European competition. On their side, the Benelux countries were favourable to the German thesis of 
preserving some monopolies for some time, punishing only the abuse of their dominant position. 
In a previous paper dealing with the negotiations of the Treaty of Rome we have already 
explained in detail the position of French business in front of this negotiation (Ramírez Pérez, 2006). 
Here we will simply underline the main questions concerning the competition articles raised by the 
Groupement syndical des constructeurs français de l’automobile (GSCFA), the CSCA and Renault. This 
is important to understand that the French position was to a certain extent very distant from what 
some of the most important industrial lobbies requested from the Socialist-Radical government of 
Prime Minister, Guy Mollet. They advocated for the introduction in the Treaty of anti-monopole 
system  to  control  the  unfair  competition  within  the  new  common  market  of  American 
multinationals.  
This  consisted  more  precisely  in  the  creation of  a  neo-corporatist  Control  Commission  on 
Foreign Investments, which would be introduced within the Treaty and made by representatives of 
member states and European business associations by sector. The suggestion was to discriminate 
between EEC companies and non-EEC companies. This Commission would authorise all investments 
of non-EEC companies by sector and, it forbade that a foreign companies control more than 30% of 
the market of a member state, nor more than 25% of the whole EEC market. If so, the superior 
amount would have duty imposed upon it (as if the declared EEC production was in reality coming 
from outside the EEC).20 In the subsequent memorandum sent to the French SGCI, the French private 
producers suggested that this Commission received information about all capital transfers coming or 
going outside the EEC countries. More crucially, its authorisation would be necessary for any take-
over or merger but respecting the veto right of the host country. Like in the French position during 
the negotiations, French industrialists insisted upon a particular surveillance towards a price policy by 
companies which would be incompatible with the production condition within the EEC.21 This fear of 
the abuse of dominant position of American multinationals was also shared by the other automobile 
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French  trade  association,  the  Chambre  syndicale  des  constructeurs  d’automobiles  (CSCA),  which 
equally asked for the suspension of the common market vis-à-vis them. Again, this scheme suggested 
the creation of a special Commission in charge of monitoring the means to set up ‘fair competition’ 
between EEC companies and American multinationals.22  
We  know  that  these  business  concerns  directly  contacted  the  French  negotiator  Robert 
Marjolin, then secretary of the Interministerial Committee for European integration (SGCI), Jacques 
Donnedieu  de  Vabres,  and  the  permanent  French  representative  in  Val  Duchesse,  Jean-François 
Deniau.23 Marjolin attempted to introduce such a Control Commission on Foreign Investments but 
without success given the strong German and Benelux opposition, which only accepted that the 
European Commission had to be informed about foreign investments, and that it could just issue 
public recommendations to different countries. However, in a presentation of the Treaty of Rome to 
Renault’s top management, Marjolin confirmed that the Treaty of Rome included a “clause which 
allow us to protect the French market against an invasion of German-American or Belgian-American 
products: it is the article 86, quoted by M.Dreyfus in his article of this evening on the newspaper Le 
Monde, which deals with monopolies, and the general safeguard clause which would allow France the 
setting up of protective measures.”24  
These contacts between French economic circles and the French EC negotiators show very 
clearly that the agreement for competition policy within the Treaty of Rome, particularly its article 
banning the abuse dominant position, was not just a German ordo-liberal victory. Instead the French 
State, both the government and one of its major state-owned industrial companies like Renault, 
were more than satisfied with the article against monopolies. If it is certain that the German view 
prevailed on several points, it is wrong to conclude that the new articles about competition were 
introduced or drafted entirely according to the German proposal. Let us analyse the final articles in 
turn and what could be exactly attributed to the ordo-liberal Germans. 
The first German success was that there were two distinct articles about cartels (article 85) and 
monopolies (article 86). The second was that it was agreed in article 87 to postpone the institutional 
decision  within  three  years  by  unanimity  or  if  later  by  qualified  majority.  However,  the  most 
fundamental  accomplishment  was  that  Germany  convinced  France  to  accept  that  in  article  86 
monopolies were not condemned by principle, but just the abuse of dominant position. We note 
here that the position of ordoliberalism is complex: clearly, for ordoliberals abuses of dominant 
position have to be condemned, because the aim is that dominant firms behave as if they were in a 
pure  competitive  market.  However,  they  also  often  have  a  strong  structuralist  suspicion  that 
dominant positions would lead to abuses, which explains their preference for per se rules. It could 
also be concluded that Germany had been partially successful in also including in article 90 state 
undertakings, and not just private companies. But this was far from being an Ordo-liberal sweeping 
victory if we look at the French demands introduced within the Treaty.  
First of all, in article 86 the Treaty introduced a non-exhaustive list of forbidden practices, 
which in fact were those originally proposed by the French: the imposition of  inequitable purchase 
or selling prices or of any other inequitable trading condition; the limitation of production, markets 
or technical development to the prejudice of the consumers; the application to parties of unequal 
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terms in respect to equivalent supplies; and lastly, the conclusion of contracts to the acceptance by a 
party of additional supplies without connection with the subject of the contract. Moreover, this list 
was not exhaustive, but pointed out as explicitly forbidden these four cases, opening a highway for 
further prohibitions in the future. In this way the French managed to obtain as much as they wished 
from the Germans in this point despite of having renounced to a total ban of principle of dominant 
positions. 
The  same  was  true  about  article  85  on  cartels  which  included  all  the  particular  French 
requests, both on the precise cartels to forbid and on three general, broad exemptions. On the latter 
they included the same four exceptions as in article 86, reducing in this way the effect of having 
created two different articles, but added another French request, to include market-sharing or the 
sharing of the sources of supply as a forbidden practice by companies. The most fundamental French 
victory  concerned  the  three  exemptions  which  authorised  cartels  were  exactly  those  it  had 
requested during the negotiations. These were much more precise and at the same time of very 
broad scope, against the German preference for strict and limited exceptions.  
Lastly, on the institutional form of application of the Treaty, the decision was postponed due 
to a transitional clause for the next three years (articles 88-90) which de facto gave all the powers of 
application of the norms to the member-states in the Council, reducing the European Commission to 
a secondary role of surveillance and suggestion of solutions to possible actions going against these 
articles. The European Court of Justice was not even mentioned, and neither was any technocratic or 
special chamber that had been proposed in the Spaak report. If this was not enough to certify the 
extent  of  the  German  ordo-liberal  defeat,  one  of  the  clearest  German  gains  of  including  State 
companies under EC competition law was somehow attenuated by an ill-defined exception towards 
services of general interests or fiscal monopolies. 
In conclusion, the competition articles ultimately applied to European firms by the Treaty of 
Rome  were  not  caused  or  dominated  by  ordo-liberal  ideas.  Rather  they  were  the  result  of  a 
compromise  between  the  perceived  national  interests  of  negotiating  parties,  mainly  France  and 
Germany, both of whom reached a synthesis which accommodated all French requests. The most 
important conclusion is that basically nothing remained from the Spaak report articles written by von 
der Groeben. Crucially, this means it is impossible to consider that from its outset the EEC possessed 
a definitive blueprint for competition policy. Instead, this was defined subsequently in and around an 
EC Regulation which was subsequently approved in 1961. 
2.3 Regulation 17/1962: European business and national interests 
As soon as the Treaty of Rome had been approved, different affected business quarters took 
public postures as regards the application of the articles on competition. Indeed, there was a clear 
sign of rising expectations about their direct effect within their national legal orders as soon as the 
Treaty of Rome entered into force in 1958. It is important that we develop here the debates and 
positions adopted by the interest associations representing multinational businesses and national 
peak associations as they provide us with an external, but interested, viewpoint about what had 
ultimately prevailed in the Treaty and the different alternatives which existed for the European 
regulation, the future 17/1962 regulation, tackling on competition articles. 
The quickest reaction came from the oldest and most prestigious of business institutions, the 
International Chamber of Commerce, where the owners of the major trans-national companies of 
the world met. Founded in 1919 to stimulate international exchanges, the ICC still has a Secretariat EU Competition Policy Revisited: Economic Doctrines Within European Political Work 
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General in Paris and its Presidents have often been Americans or Europeans.25 Apart from its national 
sections, it created also a series of working groups where European members are prominent such as 
the Committee on international business agreements affecting competition and the Committee for 
European Affairs. The former was co-president until 1957 by the French President of ELEC, Edmond 
Giscard d’Estaing, when he was appointed new President of the ICC for a period of two years.  
Indeed, it was under Giscard’s presidency at the ICC Council of Mai 1958 that this global forum 
of multinational corporations from all continents issued a resolution on the articles on restrictive 
practices  in  the  Treaty  of  Rome,  restating  the  previous  position  adopted  by  its  Committee  on 
international business agreements affecting competition some months earlier in December, after a 
detailed study presented in April by its rapporteur, Lucien Sermon. For this secretary general of the 
ELEC, the business branch of the European Movement, the problem was the general ban on cartels 
envisaged by article 85 and their automatic declaration as null and void. Multinational companies 
would have preferred, like in article 86 on monopolies, the condemnation of their abuse or negative 
effect.  Moreover,  they  rightly  saw  in  the  French  exemptions  the  door  open  to  the  “arbitrary 
intervention” of member states. But their worst case scenario was that these two articles would 
become the norm for those countries without competition law like Belgium, Italy and Luxembourg. 
For this reason the ICC requested that the European Commission publicly stated the general and non-
compulsory nature of these articles before the drafting of the exact regulation developing articles 85 
and 86, as foreseen by article 87. 26 
The May 1958 resolution of the ICC Council provided also an important corroboration of the 
French victory over the German ordo-liberals in the question of public enterprise and service of 
general economic interest as they “would benefit, following article 90, from a less rigorous treatment 
than some private enterprises in similar positions.” But more importantly the ICC confirmed the fears 
of the Benelux and Italian delegations in the negotiations, namely, that the transition period of three 
years created uncertainty and concern among business leaders, because it was impossible for them 
to appreciate if their cartel agreements were forbidden. This uncertainty raised doubts about which 
companies would effectively profit from the creation of the common market, and called for a clear 
position of the Council on this question of the non-applicability of the EEC competition articles by 
national-governments until the new regulation had been passed. This position was not new because 
the ICC national chapters had sent this resolution to their national government, but without any clear 
effect. For this reason the ICC addressed this time a call to the Commission of the EEC to issue a 
formal statement about it. 
Taking a clear stand on the future drafting of the future regulation, the ICC Council went much 
further,  as  it  requested  that  the  new  regulation  deepened  exemptions  for  ‘beneficial  cartels’ 
introduced in article 85. For this reason it also urged the Council to publicly present its general 
guidelines and criteria in this matter with a consultation of the interested parties prior to the future 
regulation. In the ICC view, it was of fundamental importance to decide on the criteria upon which it 
would be decided if a particular practice was contrary to articles 85 and 86, leaving exclusively to the 
European institutions, and not to national governments, the decision to forbid certain agreement or 
practices.  This  preference  for  supranational  institutions  was  conditional  to  the  finding  of  facts 
through a deep research and juridical enquiry proving the prejudice of an agreement, either by its 
object or effect, to the aims of the common market, to trade between member states, or to the free 
interplay of competition.27 
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This  position  was  a  clear  invitation  to  the  new  Hallstein  Commission  and  to  the  new 
Commissioner for Competition, Hans von der Groeben, for rapid action. This position had not been 
an easy one to adopt within the ICC. The delegations from the USA, UK and Germany would have 
preferred not to take the risk of provoking with this position an acceleration of the timing in the 
issuing of the regulation (whose initiative was within the hands of the Council for a period of three 
years, before passing into a Commission initiative, if nothing had been made within this period). 
Moreover, it was feared that a rushed debate would only deepen the blocking of positions in the 
Council regarding the most controversial aspects introduced in the Treaty. 
In  contrast,  the  delegation  most  favourable  to  a  quick  and  direct  public  response  to  the 
position of the ICC was the French, headed by René Arnaud, General Secretary of the Conseil des 
fédérations industrielles d’Europe (CIFE), which included the representatives of national industrial 
federations of the OEEC member states. (Rollings & Kipping,  2004).28 The reason was surely very 
similar to that argued by Jean Louis, President of the French CNPF section for European affairs, and 
Robert Fabre, from its international commission, namely that it was necessary to quickly restore the 
general validity of cartels as a means to permit European, and French, firms to adapt themselves to 
the elimination of trade barriers. Both men shared  the conviction of Raymond Lartisien, CNPF’s 
representative  and  President  of  the  Commission  for  Competition  rules  of the  federation  of  EEC 
industries, UNICE, that the accommodating French model of competition policy would impose itself 
as  the  example  to  follow.  (Warlouzet,  2008)29  It  was  obvious  that  the  Benelux  countries  also 
supported the quick publication of the report, but only under the name of Sermon, and not of the 
ICC. In favour too of a public position of the ICC was the Italian delegation, whose commission for 
competition matters was within the hands of Fiat through its young owner, Gianni Agnelli, and Fiat’s 
economists  and  business  lawyers,  particularly  Fiat’s  top  economist  Carlo  Bussi  and  the  lawyers 
Vittorino Chiusano, and Professor Eugenio Minoli from the University of Modena. In their view a mid-
way  solution  was  that  the  ICC  presented  the  same  conclusions  of  the  report  but  with  a  less 
aggressive tone than that adopted by Sermon in his paper.30  
The final decision adopted by the ICC council to issue this resolution showed that the EEC 
countries imposed their view, despite the reluctance of Italian and Belgium quarters that lacking a 
national legislation for competition, their national governments could start using the EEC Treaty as 
soon as possible. Maybe pushed by a stronger sense of urgency than in the countries already with 
legislation,  Fiat  instructed  Professor  Minoli  to  take  up  Sermon’s  call  with  a  policy  paper  to  be 
submitted to the European Commission about the shape of the forthcoming regulation. Emanating 
from the Italian section of the ICC, the Minoli paper, which the Confindustria did not approve, had 
two objectives: on the one hand, it subordinated the illegality of a cartel to the effective existence of 
damage to trade between EEC countries, by focusing on the finding of damage, and not the moment 
when the cartel had been agreed. This subtlety served to block the retroactive application of the law. 
On  the  other  hand,  Minoli  suggested  that  the  regulation  create  a  supranational  administrative 
authority  with  the  power  of  enquiry,  but  also  of  legal  initiative,  together  with  a  panel  whose 
members would be economic and legal experts independent from administrative pressures, who 
would decide on the compatibility of the cartels with the Treaty.31 The idea of an independent anti-
trust authority following the American or German model seemed to be the clear design for Fiat and 
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the large Italian multinationals within the Italian section of the ICC. Summing up, in the view of the 
largest European multinationals, there was already some leeway to shape the definitive form of the 
implementation of the Treaty of Rome. 
The Commission quickly answered the ICC request for clarification because this demand also 
came from the UK, who wanted to know the way this would affect its companies, and Germany, 
where a real polemic was taken place as the German law started to become operational in 1958. 
Directed by commissioner von der Groeben, DG IV enquired how to start a coordination of member 
states application of the rules to avoid a different application of the articles in different cases, and 
requested that the states without legislation, like Italy, could quickly approve a system which could 
help them to pursue cartels and monopolies according to the new legislation.32 In its first general 
report, and in a speech delivered in October 1958 by President Hallstein, the Commission stressed 
that article 88 of the Treaty made clear that the principles of competition were valid from the first 
day, and that national governments were supposed to apply them as if they were their own laws. 
Such a principle was stressed by the director-general for industry, the Dutch Pieter Verloren Van 
Themaat, insisting that they were compulsory obligations for member states and not just general 
principles. The Commission saw its role as a coordinator of all national systems because it became 
very clear from the member states that the regulation would have to wait for at least the three years 
forecasted by the Treaty.  
For Fiat, the position of the European Commission only served to accelerate the introduction 
of a “restrictive and demagogic” Italian competition bill. The strategy that the Italian multinational 
followed  to  prevent  such  a  perspective  was  to  keep  using  the  ICC  to  put  pressure  on  the 
governments of Belgium and Luxemburg to pass their laws earlier and become the reference for a 
future  Italian  law.  It  also searched  to  make  of  the  ICC  an  official  and  privileged  partner  of  the 
Commission (as it was for the United Nations).33 This last strategy was successful as in early 1961 
Commissioner von der Groeben and Director-General Van Themaat, met the ICC commission for 
cartels, headed by the French President of Pechiney, Raoul de Vitry d’Avaucourt, Lucien Sermon, 
Eugenio Minoli, René Arnaud, and the legal advisers of Philips, AEG, Imperial Chemical, and also an 
American  business  lawyer,  George  Nebolsine  from  Coudert  Brothers.  On  that  occasion,  they 
supported  the  Fiat  proposal  to  appoint  a  “Federal  Trade  Commission  without  decision-making 
power”, which would act as a consultative independent committee similar to a court and made up of 
judges and other economic and legal experts. Minoli added that it would not take power out of the 
Commission which would decide in the last instance  and not affect the member states with an 
already existing legislation. For the ICC the ideal model would be the creation of a specialised Anti-
trust Court.34 
An additional reason for Fiat to search for this different channel of influence was that there 
was an open conflict with Confindustria in the strategy to follow in this concern, given that like all the 
other national trade associations from EEC countries within UNICE, the Italian confederation aimed 
to delay, and not accelerate like Fiat, the development of the Treaty in competition matters, on the 
basis that the European Commission would become trapped with practical and legal difficulties. 
According to the CNPF, the three year period would serve to demonstrate the utility of cartels. This 
strategy  was  even  followed  by  the  German  BDI  which  had  unsuccessfully  opposed  a  very  strict 
German anti-cartel law. For this reason they supported the attempt of French industry to make the 
more accommodating French cartel law the model for the future regulation of the EEC. UNICE put all 
                                                      
32 HAEC, BAC 001, 1971 (79), Direction générale de la Concurrence, Note confidentiel pour la Commission sur les premières questions à 
trancher en vue de l’application des articles 85 à 89 du Traité, 14-07-1958. 
33 ASF, Statistica, 39/2364, CCI, Sezione Italiana, 03-02-1959. 
34 HAEC/BAC 089/1983/11. CEE, Commission, DG Concurrence, Compte rendu succinct de la réunion tenue le 13 mars 1961 avec le groupe 
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its hopes on Marjolin and the French government (whose Minister of Industry Jeanneney had already 
asked Prime Minister Debré to oppose making the Commission responsible for this policy), being able 
to block von der Groeben’s attempt to impose on the EEC the German model that his master, Ludwig 
Erhard, had just imposed on German industry.35 
In sum, business representatives took different positions towards the future EEC regulation on 
competition. Whereas the ICC led by Fiat and Brufina still aimed to exclude the nation-states from 
the future governance of the system, UNICE and its national federations pinned all their hopes on 
action by the nation-states to block the Ordo-liberal attempt from the European Commission to 
introduce the restrictive German legislation on an EU-wide scale. At the end of the day, UNICE was 
right because the regulation was only presented by the European Commission after the three years 
scheduled by the Treaty, ie. after it no longer had to achieve unanimity in the Council to pass this 
regulation. The question was obviously put on the table after one year during the last days of 1961 
by Germany, whose strict legislation disadvantaged its firms in relationship to the rest of Europe. It 
was precisely during the famous “marathon” negotiations to enter into the second stage of the 
Common Market through the approval of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) scheme submitted 
by the Commission, that Germany made adoption of the Regulation on competition an absolute 
condition for accepting a CAP requested by France and the Netherlands.36 The regulation had already 
been under discussion for several months and, according to the Renault’s manager for external 
affairs, Lorenceau: “to a large extent, it gave satisfaction to German thesis”.37 Was this really the 
case?  
Analysis of Regulation 17/1962 does not fully confirm this point. It is true that in his note about 
the regulation, the Renault manager pointed out that its main feature was that the companies were 
constrained to declare all the cartels in which they were involved, excepting those which did not 
affect  import  or  export  between  EEC  member  states,  before  the  date  of  August  1962.  This 
notification system was one of the three major points of disagreement in the Council debates, the 
other two having been the creation of a consultative committee, and the juridical nature of the 
exceptions which permitted a cartel. For the French, this was an error because, for administrative 
reasons, it was impossible to put into practice given the important numbers of agreements which 
had to be notified (especially as companies had no means of knowing beforehand if they would be 
accepted  or  not).  This  fear  turned  to  be  justified,  because  there  was  an  accumulation  of  cases 
without resolution, discrediting DG IV. 
The second element of the supposed German victory was that the institution in charge of 
competition  policy  was  exclusively  the  European  Commission,  something  which  could  not  be 
considered a surprise given that also in the managing of the CAP the Commission had won such a 
battle. There was not much that France could do to stop the Commission from this exclusivity as 
already in the negotiations the other EEC countries were already in favour of giving decisional powers 
to the European Commission. However, the French request for a role of the Council had not entirely 
been  left out  of the  regulation,  because  its  article 10  created  a  Consultative  Committee  whose 
consultation was compulsory for the European Commission. This Committee was very different from 
the one suggested by the Economic and Social Committee (which excluded civil servants from the 
member  states  and  gave  priority  to  qualified  economic  and  legal  experts  chosen  among  the 
organisations represented within the Social and Economic Committee, including representatives of 
consumers organisation). This was the furthest that the suggestions of large European multinationals 
got, because in the Consultative Committee actually created by the Regulation, its members only 
                                                      
35 AN 72 AS 1388, Réunion de la commission des règles de concurrence UNICE, 15-04-1958, quoted in L.Warlouzet, op.cit., p.190. 
36 Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de la France, Représentation Permanente, RPUE 1143, Note de François-Xavier Ortoli, secrétaire 
générale du SGCI, 17-11-1961, cité en L.Warlouzet, op.cit.,p.192. 
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represented the member states. Subsequently their role was to be of importance because they had 
to be informed in detail in all cases (producing minutes of their discussion before any decision was 
taken in this field, but whose opinions were not made public). 
The importance of this Committee is that whenever a case would arrive before the College of 
the Commissioners, each of them would already know very well the view of their own member state 
and the reasons for it. Moreover, if the regulation established the Commission’s monopoly for the 
application of exceptions to cartels, it did not do so in relationship to the general control of cartels, 
leaving national authorities the possibility to do  so, even if it was not clear whether they were 
obliged  to,  a  fundamental  issue  for  countries  without  legislation  like  Italy.  In  this  concern,  the 
European Commission was a step backwards in supranationality in relationship to the ECSC where 
there was no place for enforcement activities by national competition authorities or national courts. 
France  had  also  obtained  in  the  negotiations  two  further  concessions:  the  possibility  of  the 
Commission  to  carry  out  sectoral  enquiries  when  dealing  with  anti-cartel  behaviour;  and  the 
notification of exclusivity agreements. 
In conclusion, with Regulation 17/62 representatives of Germany certainly obtained the victory 
of not having at the European level a much less strict system that the one that they had approved at 
home.  Moreover,  they  allowed  German  competition  policy  to  preserve  its  specificity  towards 
domestic  cartels  and  monopolies.  Indeed,  however,  it  was  this  fear  of  disadvantaging  German 
enterprises in international competition, rather than just the ideological faith of Ordo-liberals, which 
brought Adenauer’s Germany to accept to barter their financial support for the Common Agricultural 
Policy in exchange for the approval of Regulation 17/62. In so doing they enabled German ordo-
liberals to catch the train that they missed in the Spaak report and the Treaty of Rome. But this was 
also  because  the  ordo-liberal  project  for  European  competition  law  was  one  which  would  give 
control to an independent administrative authority as in Germany. Finally, as we set out below, it 
was one thing to have fought to introduce a certain system of rules for competition, and a very 
different  issue  to  actually  succeed  in  using  it  to  reduce  existing,  and  forthcoming,  cartels  and 
monopolies.38 
2.4 The beginnings of policy failure: 1963-69 
By 1963 the DG IV had received more than 900 notifications of multilateral agreements and 
34,500 bilateral agreements, most of which were vertical agreements, like those of the automobile 
industry. This sector alone notified 500 agreements with dealers within the six countries of the EEC. 
As  the  French  had  forecasted,  it  soon  appeared  that  the  kingdom  of  von  der  Groeben,  was 
administratively unable to handle one by one all the notified cases. In spite of the increasing pressure 
of all member states, including Ordo-liberal Germany, the Commission took long delays to issue 
decisions which could serve to enlighten EEC firms about how to draft their collaboration agreements 
without fearing of being outlawed and fined at a later stage. The situation was increasingly tough for 
DG IV which argued that it could not take any decision of principle without having evaluated the 
thousand of agreements which it had received (Warlouzet, 2008) 
In 1964, the situation had not yet been solved and the situation was graphically described by 
the French permanent representative, Jean-Marc Boegner, as a paralysis of DG IV “from down to top 
of the hierarchy.(…) at the level of directors inefficiency is pervasive(…) the Commissioner and his 
cabinet do not trust their services and they doubt to introduce badly finalised cases to the juridical 
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service, and even less to the College of Commissioners.(…)The Commission appears reluctant to meet 
the member states, as a proof of its embarrassment”.39 It was only in September of 1964 that DG IV 
issued its first decision to forbid a cartel from a vertical agreement, the famous Grundig-Costen case, 
whose confirmation by the European Court of Justice took place nearly two years later, in 1966. 
Simultaneously, von der Groeben convinced the Council to issue Regulation 19/65, which gave 
the Commission the discretionary power to decide on block exemptions only for exclusive dealing 
and  licensing  agreements.  This  regulation  passed  with  great  difficulties  because  the  Italian 
government, which had unsuccessfully opposed the granting of block exemption powers, in 1965 
appealed  this  majority  decision  to  the  Court  of  Justice  with  the  hope  of  having  the  Regulation 
cancelled on the basis that article 85 could not be applied to vertical agreements like those of 
automobile distribution.  
Again, it was the Court of Justice the responsible of the rescue of DG IV, but the application of 
the block exemption had still to wait until this decision had confirmed the Council authorisation. It 
was again, only with the Council authorisation, that DG IV managed to pass regulation 67/67 about 
block exemptions for exclusive distribution and purchasing regulation(Swann, 1978). That same year, 
when the patient, long march towards an Ordo-liberal competition policy was about to take shape, 
von der Groeben was taken away from DG IV, to take responsibility for Internal Market and Regional 
Policy, substituted by the Dutch M.J.A.Sassen. The only hope to continue this policy was that von der 
Groeben’s head of cabinet, Albrecht, was simultaneously appointed director general, substituting the 
Dutch Social democrat Verloren Van Themaat. 
In sum, a decade passed by from the signature of the Treaty of Rome until the moment in 
which DG IV could actually start using its anti-cartel powers vis-à-vis European companies with some 
confidence, but always seriously curtailed by the Council and protected by the Court of Justice. 
Meanwhile DG IV was fighting for having the powers for its ambitions, the backlog of notified cases in 
important industrial sectors like the automobile industry remained in a legal limbo for many years. 
For example, the first automobile distribution agreements were not authorised until March 1972, 
when DG IV issued its first decision on a case of automobile distribution involving BMW Germany, an 
agreement notified in 1963.40 Indeed, one thing was to preach the ordoliberal credo and other to act 
according to it and having in impact on real existing cartels and monopolies.  
Summing up, if the articles on competition of the Treaty of Rome were a victory for neo-
mercantilist French conceptions on competition, German ordoliberals balanced this partial defeat 
with a relative success in Regulation 17/62. However, the latter turned out to be largely ineffective 
due not only to the lack of administrative capacity of ordoliberals to implement it, but also to the 
political guerrilla warfare carried out by their neo-mercantilist opponents in France and Italy to block 
other  important  draft  Regulations  in  competition  law  that  would  have  given  more  content  and 
powers to the ordoliberals.  
Indeed, a vivid illustration of the difficulties of ordoliberals to claim victory over competition 
policy  are  the  words  written  in  1969,  and  presumably  in  optimistic  terms,  by  the  first  of  all 
ordoliberals, the President of the European Commission Walter Hallstein. For him, competition policy 
“was growing slowly and steadily, like a tree.(…) Admittedly, it took a good deal of time to get thins 
moving. Regulation nº 17 came into force only after four years of arguments and debate, in 1962. (…) 
It was not until 1965 that the Commission was empowered to exempt certain types of engagements 
                                                      
39 Idem. 
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in restraint of competition from the general prohibition against cartels, and it was not until 1967 that 
the Commission could eventually use that power. (…) While the decisions of the Commission and the 
European Court of Justice in interpreting article 85 of the Treaty of Rome are gradually giving effect 
to  the  provisions  it  embodies,  the  application  of  article  86  is  presenting  the  Commission  with 
considerable difficulties.” 41  
This optimistic statement can also be seen as a confession by Hallstein of the fundamental 
incapacity  of  the  Commission  he  directed  for  nearly  a  decade  to  make  EC  competition  policy 
ordoliberal. Although some important developments were to take place in this direction during the 
1970s, the overall trend was, on the contrary, still in favour of neo-mercantilist economic doctrine 
and  its  defenders  within  large  firms,  national  governments  and  even  the  European  Commission 
(Ramirez-Perez & Smith, 2009). It was only from the mid-1980s that change began to take place 
which, albeit temporarily, allowed ordoliberals to gain more influence. 
3. Full Institutionalization of EC Competition Policy (1985-92):An 
ordo-liberal/Chicago School Alliance begins to take charge 
Indeed, in the space of seven to eight years at the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s, the 
EC’s  competition  policy  was  transformed  from  a  relatively  weak  set  of  instruments  largely 
overshadowed by neo-mercantilist approaches to sectorized industrial intervention into a tightly knit 
policy placed at the heart of a revitalized neoliberal economic doctrine made and implemented not 
only  ‘in  Brussels’  but  also  throughout  the  member  states. Many  analyses  of  this  radical change 
highlight a combination of two arguments. First, the single market programme and Single European 
Act  (SEA)  is  seen  as  providing  the  touchstone  for  the  relaunch  of  competition  policy  (Cohen  & 
Lorenzi, 2000). Second, the rise of neo-liberalism in several key member states had also reached the 
Commission  by  the  late  1980s  (Hooghe,  2001).  In  short  the  activation  of  an  EU  government  of 
competition policy is often explained as simply the result of intergovernmental consensus over the 
need to reinvigorate the EU’s economy by not only completing the single market but also injecting 
neo-liberal doctrine into this process. 
Apart from being fundamentally over-general, this argument possesses a number of specific 
and deeper flaws. First, the SEA contained nothing actually on competition policy (Armstrong and 
Bulmer, 1998: 93). Rather its prime focus was upon the removal of a whole range of barriers to intra-
Community trade. Second, neo-liberalism is a very ‘broad church’ and evocations of the market were 
made  by  actors  from  many  different  political  party  and  ideological  backgrounds  (Jabko,  2006). 
Moreover,  as  we  have  seen  in  Parts  1  and  2,  many  neoliberals  disagreed  strongly  amongst 
themselves about the principles and operationalization of competition policy. 
Instead, in such order to grasp the radical change in the status and impact of a European-wide 
competition policy, the hypothesis developed here is centred upon the political work undertaken by 
a range of actors in order to transform latent resources in the single market programme into actual 
change of competition policy. More precisely, the claim set out and partly tested here is that during 
the first two Delors Presidencies: 
- ordoliberals within DG IV joined forces with actors closer to the Chicago School (notably the 
commissioners Peter Sutherland and Leon Brittan and their respective cabinets), thus creating 
a  neo-liberal  alliance  in  order  to  defeat  neo-mercantilist  theorists  and  actors  within  and 
without the Commission; 
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-  this  alliance  was  founded  upon  a  reproblematization  of  the  single  market  project  around 
competition policy and the  politicization of issues concerning inter-firm competition. More 
precisely,  in  so  doing  a  number  of  ‘technical’,  mostly  legal,  reasons  were  provided  by 
ordoliberal civil servants in DG IV – in particular by underlining that protecting competition was 
a fundamental treaty obligation linked to free movement rules and market integration goals 
(Schweitzer, 2007: 39-40). But change in the problematization of EU competition policy was 
only institutionalized following work that politicized it using value-based argumentation and 
publicization. Here the key actors were commissioners Sutherland and Brittan. 
Overall our argument is that the key to the neo-liberal alliance’s victory over neo-mercantilism 
was the fusion of the technical and the political realised by a key set actors within the Commission 
and their mobilization of their respective networks beyond its walls (Joana & Smith, 2002). The 
remainder of this section illustrates this thesis first through the case of merger control, then around 
the issue of sectoral liberalization. 
3.1 Merger Control: a clear defeat for neo-mercantilism 
One of the most controversial areas of competition policy is the control of mergers. This was 
particularly so in the mid to late 1980s when the SEA fuelled a ‘boom’ in merger activity as firms 
sought to anticipate and adapt to the completion of the single market. In order to govern large 
mergers affecting firms in two or more member states, since 1973 the Commission had regularly 
been proposing a Regulation on this issue but their proposals always got blocked by ‘sovereignist’ 
and neo-mercantilist opponents in the Council42. In legal terms, the adoption of this Regulation in 
1989  thus  constituted  a  watershed  because  it  both  transferred  power  to  the  Commission  and 
provided  it  with  an  instrument  for  outlawing  industrial  policy  to  create  ‘European  champions’. 
However, in order to fully grasp the change in competition policy this Regulation heralded, one needs 
to closely examine the political work that both made this legislation possible and then transformed 
its doctrinal and operational content into an institutionalized practice of EU government. 
The first stage of this process of argumenting and alliance-building featured an initial attempt 
to reproblematize merger control as a positive change for the ‘environment’ of Europe’s key firms. 
Much of this work took place within and around an elite group of European company directors set up 
by the Commission in the early 1980s: the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT). Although this 
forum is generally perceived within social science  as one dominated both by attempts to make 
European sectoral policies and the leadership of the Commissioner for Industry -Etienne Davignon- 
(Van Laer, 2007), it is important to recognise that representatives of DG IV also participated in the 
ERT  and  sought  to  influence  proceedings  (Van  Apeldoorn,  2002).  Indeed,  not  only  did  ‘their’ 
commissioner from 1981 to 1984 Frans Andriessen invest in the ERT (Cini & McGowan, 2009: 31), but 
his successor, Peter Sutherland used this platform to urge the ERT to become: ‘a strong supporter of 
EC  merger  regulation,  perceiving  it  as  an  instrument  that  could  be  used  to  ease  cross-border 
restructuring (…) it was only after a number of meetings between Commissioner Sutherland and ERT 
members that the latter became persuaded that EC regulation of big mergers would constitute an 
attractive  alternative  to  regulation  in  several  jurisdictions’  (Buch-Hansen,  2007:  7).  According  to 
Buch-Hansen,  this  work  of  argumentation  in  favour  of  the  EU  government  of  competition  also 
entailed the building of alliances between Commission staff and the European employers association 
(UNICE), together with other important actors such as the American Chamber of Commerce and the 
CEFIC. This political work was also extended into a number of member states who began to reform 
their own competition decision-making bodies during this period43. In France, for example, in 1986 La 
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Commission  de  la  Concurrence  was  transformed  into  a  decision-making  body:  Le  Conseil  de  la 
Concurrence44. 
In 1987 this progressively ongoing political work suddenly took strength and focus from a 
second and unpredictable source of the ‘naturalization’ of the EC government of competition: The 
European  Court of  Justice  (ECJ).  When  reviewing  a  Commission  decision  concerning  the  merger 
between Philip Morris and Rothmans, the court ruled for the first time that Article 85 of the Treaty of 
Rome on restrictive agreements and cartels could apply if a merger that caused a concentration of 
market  dominance  resulted  from  agreements  by  the  two  companies.  In  the  short  term,  this 
judgement  thus  ‘opened up  Article  86’s  applicability  to regulating merger  control’  (Armstrong  & 
Bulmer, 1998: 95). But from a wider perspective, the ECJ’s decision highlighted that the EC did not 
possess an institutionalized means of regulating company mergers. Indeed, as Armstrong and Bulmer 
underline, this ‘resultant corporate uncertainty’ came to be ‘a dynamic instability that could only be 
overcome by agreement to purpose built arrangements’ by the Member states (1998: 95). 
Indeed, if the ECJ’s ruling created uncertainty for many actors, it was simultaneously perceived 
by proponents of the EU government of competition as providing a legal and political opportunity 
that  they  could  cash  in  on.  This  third  stage  of  the  institutionalization  of  EU  merger  policy  is 
inextricably linked with two steps in the political work carried out by the next commissioner for 
competition –Leon Brittan- his cabinet and officials from DG IV.  
Step one of this work was of course centred upon getting the draft merger Regulation adopted 
by  the  Council.  If  today’s  competition  commissioner  generally  has  few  formalized  dealings  with 
representatives of the member states through the Council, this was definitely not the case during 
Brittan’s mandate. Adopting the mergers Regulation within this body entailed intense debates over 
the general economic doctrine behind this legislation, in particular whether its aim was to favour the 
emergence  of  ‘European  Champions’  (a  neo-mercantilist  framing  favoured  by  the  French 
government) or ‘to encourage competition between firms regardless of their size’ (Brittan’s Chicago 
School  influenced  framing  and  that  other  governments,  in  particular  that  of  the  UK).  Just  as 
importantly,  however,  this  negotiation  also  entailed  more  specific  points  of  economic  doctrine 
regarding competition policy itself. Here on the one hand Brittan and his allies sought to technicize 
clauses of the Regulation that would provide rules for the implementation of competition law (such 
as thresholds for EC intervention and on how geographical concentrations should be calculated). On 
the other hand, however, this alliance also recognized the political dimension of such clauses45. 
Overall, through a combination of legal and politicized argument it fought off the attempted counter-
attack made during the Council negotiations by their neo-mercantilist opponents (Joana & Smith, 
2002: 127-128). 
Once adopted, the 1989 merger Regulation (8064/89) led immediately to the creation of a 
Mergers task force with additional personnel within DG Competition and, more generally, to an 
increased number of decisions on mergers and acquisitions, many of which were highly controversial. 
Indeed, it was largely through the making of Commission decisions on specific merger cases that the 
EU’s government of mergers became fully institutionalized. Indeed, this is where step 2 of the Brittan 
alliance’s strategy occurred, a process around which a great deal of intra and extra-Commission 
political work was undertaken. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
privatisation of public companies in particular, was an important source of merger and acquisition activity, much of which entailed actors 
from different countries. 
44 Now staffed by a permanent Council and professionalized staff, as of 1989 the Conseil de la Concurrence began to make a series of 
decisions, and thus its own jurisprudence, against restrictive practices and oligopolistic firm behaviour (Dumez & Jeunemaître, 1991; Smith, 
2009). 
45 As Simon Bulmer underlines, ‘the threshold decisions were by no means the product of a debate aimed at rational identification of the 
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In the making and taking of decisions on competition cases such as merger authorizations, the 
commissioner  whose  portfolio  includes  inter-firm  competition  obviously  possesses  a  number  of 
resources that his or her homologues do not. In particular, they have direct access to the services of 
DG IV and thus to technical expertise. However, one must not forget that if the college votes on a 
decision then each commissioner is formally an equal. Consequently, competition commissioners 
must anticipate such a vote and either work to avoid it, or ensure that if there is a vote that they 
themselves  have  created  a  sufficiently  powerful  coalition  (Joana  &  Smith,  2002).  Such  alliance 
building is no easy achievement given that each commissioner may well be simultaneously under 
pressure from their respective member state and the clientele of their own portfolios. From this 
perspective, Brittan and his team set out to innovate in their treatment of controversial mergers and 
acquisition  cases  by  building  alliances  against  neo-mercantilist  and/or  ‘national  interest’  driven 
actors  who  sought  to  dilute  the  1989  Regulation  through  pressurizing  the  college  during  its 
implementation. In order to do so, throughout 1990 and most of 1991 Brittan’s team sought out a 
case that would allow them to test the new mergers regulation. This they found in the shape of the 
proposed takeover of the light aircraft manufacturer De Havilland by Aérospatiale and Alenia (ATR). 
Despite much publicized interventions by French and Italian ministers, Brittan managed to win a 
debate in the College that was both highly political (over whether a strict application of competition 
policy was consubstantial with the completion of the single market) and highly technical (in particular 
through defining ‘relevant markets’ and ‘abuse of dominant position’) (Dumez & Jeunemaître, 1992; 
Joana & Smith, 2002: 127-9). Indeed, the Commission’s ruling was strongly driven by an economic 
doctrine that bore the imprint of ordoliberals because it essentially argued that the domination of 
the market in question would be an ‘exclusionary abuse’, rather than demonstrating that this abuse 
would be ‘exploitative’46. But it was also clearly influenced by the doctrine, discourse and rhetoric 
which Brittan and his cabinet injected into this debate. Of course, this DeHavilland-ATR decision did 
not automatically confirm that Brittan and his allies would automatically dominate the college over 
such decisions thereafter. However, it certainly created a powerful precedent which facilitated their 
political work over mergers from then on. 
3.2 Sectoral Liberalization: The Neo-Mercantilists fight back but lose ground 
If  merger  authorizations  constituted  one  front  upon  which  the  Brittan-DG  IV  led  alliance 
sought to make progress against their neo-mercantilist opponents, a second important and wider 
area of conflict concerned the EC’s regulation of specific industries. In the 1970s and early 1980s, 
neo-mercantilism  was  of  course  most  visible  in  the  ‘industrial  patriotism’  practised  by  national 
governments such as that of France in the case of steel (Hayward, 1986). However, as the historian 
Van Laer underlines (2007), it is important to also recall and underline how at that time a form of 
European neo-mercantilism was also influencing thinking within the Commission, particularly within 
DGs III (Internal Market and Industrial Affairs) and XIII (Information technology)47. In this regard, 
proponents of neoliberal economic doctrine clearly had considerable political work to accomplish in 
order to counter the strength of neo-mercantilist doctrines and their impact upon Commission policy 
proposals. Indeed, during Brittan’s time in office it would be an exaggeration to conclude that the 
alliance he headed totally defeated their opponents by transforming economic doctrine within the 
Commission. Nevertheless, as the following two examples illustrate, during the period 1989-92 the 
opposition between neo-mercantilism and neo-liberalism became more overt and, in general terms, 
began to strongly favour the challenger. 
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merger was thereby predicted to lead to a 50% share of the world market and 67% of the European one. Although some qualitative points 
were also made about the likely effect upon consumers, no forecasting of prices was undertaken (Dumez & Jeunemaître, 1992: 111).  
47 Indeed, Van Laer goes as far as to consider that in the mid-1980s representatives of the Commission were ‘mostly interventionist’ (2007: 
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The first illustration of this battle over the Commission’s trans-industry approach to sectoral 
regulation occurred mainly in 1990 around a Communication that came to be entitled Industrial 
Policy  in  an  Open  and  Competitive  Environment.  Guidelines  for  a  Community  Approach48.  Two 
decades  on  this  text  can  appear  anecdotal,  but  at  the  time  it  was  an  artefact  around  which 
proponents of different economic doctrines within the Commission clashed directly. As Ross relates 
in fascinating detail (1993), President Delors was actively involved in this debate through arguing that 
the Single Market had to become more an ‘organized space’ within which ‘post-dirigiste’ industrial 
policy could be applied (Ross, 1993: 21). Brittan, his cabinet and officials from DG IV provided the 
polar opposite to this position by arguing against any form of EU intervention that would threaten 
the effects of market forces and competition policy. Meanwhile other commissioners –particularly 
Martin Bangemann and his officials from DG III- lined themselves up in different parts of a middle 
ground. Finally, ‘a compromise text’ was approved which, overall gave more power to the Brittan 
alliance because it ‘reinforced the idea of competition policy in general but allowed several sectoral 
exceptions’ (Van Laer, 2007: 46). 
Occurring just after the approval of this Communication, the second illustration of political 
work conducted by ‘the Brittans’ concerned one such sector: electronics. Since at least the 1960s and 
70s, DG IV had strongly tended to grant this ‘strategic industry’ de facto exceptional status. For 
example, in 1983 the Commission authorized a merger between Grundig and Thomson (Van Laer, 
2007: 31). However, the beginning of a change in approach was taken in 1988 when Commissioner 
Sutherland and DG IV successfully decided to use Article 90 to open up the European market for 
telecommunications  terminals  (Van  Laer,  2007:46).  By  the  autumn  of  1990,  however,  calls  for 
treating electronics as ‘strategic’ once more through reactivating EC and national public intervention 
(state aids and increased tariffs) became vociferous as a range of European companies49 invoked a 
crisis prompted largely by Japanese imports. Within the Commission, Delors and his cabinet again 
sought new means to redynamize what they saw as a key part of Europe’s industry (Ross, 1993). 
Officials  from  DG  XIII  were  charged  with  producing  the  first  draft  of  a  new  Commission 
Communication.  However,  this  draft  drew  heavy  criticism  from  many  commissioners,  and  in 
particular a politicized counter-attack by Leon Brittan50. Indeed, throughout debate over succeeding 
drafts of this text, Brittan’s cabinet strongly opposed what they saw as the reintroduction of neo-
mercantilism  using  both  technical/legal  and  politicized  arguments51.  Ultimately,  however,  lacking 
sectoral economic data and knowledge, partisans of neo-liberal doctrine were unable to forge an 
intra-college alliance capable of blocking proponents of sectoral intervention and, thus, publication 
of a Communication on the electronics industry that left the door open to public intervention52. 
Despite  such  industry-specific  setbacks,  overall  the  political  work  undertaken  to  fully 
institutionalize  a  European  competition  policy  undertaken  by  Brittan’s  team  led  to  a  change  of 
relationship between DG VI and the rest of the Commission’s administrative services. Several other 
DGs were concerned here, in particular Industry and those dealing with individual sectors, but also 
the Commission’s Legal Service (Cini & McGowan, 2009). Not only did members of Brittan’s cabinet 
frequently intervene in inter-cabinet meetings to ensure that the Commission no longer ‘sidled into 
industrial policy’ (Ross, 1993), but upstream of these encounters they encouraged officials from DG 
IV to work within inter-service meetings to ensure that competition policy was respected throughout 
this administration. In so doing, DG IV became an organization that was both internally tight and 
                                                      
48 Com (90)556 final, 16
th November, 1990. 
49 Namely Olivetti, Bull, Thomson, Philipps and Siemens. 
50 Speech to the College of Europe, 29
th January, 1991. 
51 A sociologist who observed these clashes first hand recounts that Brittan’s cabinet representative, Katherine Day, openly said in a final 
inter-cabinet meeting that a particular clause was ‘on the left. Sir Leon will not allow the Commission to get involved in sectoral industrial 
policy’ (Ross, 1993: 35). 
52 The Community’s Electronics and Informatics Industry, communication, spring 1991. EU Competition Policy Revisited: Economic Doctrines Within European Political Work 
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externally feared. From this base they worked to transform their problematization of competition 
policy into ‘the conventional wisdom’ of the Commission53. 
Of course, the political work undertaken by Brittan and the neoliberal alliance he headed also 
targeted a wider audience of interested parties and commentators. A great deal of speech-making 
was made to representatives of business associations, large firms and national administrations54. 
Through, extolling the virtues of competition and criticizing interventionism with titles such as ‘A 
Bonfire  of  Subsidies’55,  Brittan  sought  ‘to  be  taken  seriously  both  intellectually  and  politically’56. 
Indeed,  beyond  public  speech-making,  Brittan  was  also  the  spearhead  of  a  campaign  of  public 
communication which used influential newspapers, in particular The Financial Times, in order to 
present its arguments and thereby seek to create new allies throughout the EC and beyond (Joana & 
Smith, 2002: part III).   
In summary, this section has sought to set out how and why by 1992 EU competition policy 
had finally become institutionalized. In so doing, it has begun to show how a new alliance of neo-
liberal politicians and civil servants began to systematically defeat their neo-mercantilist opponents. 
But much research still remains to be done into at least two dimensions of this key period of change. 
Firstly, one needs to integrate into analysis of the changing government of the EU developments 
around competition policy that at the time were taking place within many national decision-making 
arenas. Our hypothesis here is that changes in EC rules and authority in the late 1980s were not 
imposed upon unreceptive national actors. On the contrary, through engendering common cognitive 
scripts  and  institutionalizing  a  long  existing  European  network  of  actors,  the  premises  of  the 
institutionalization  of  an  EC  government  of  competition  took  their  strength  from  being 
simultaneously ‘national’ and ‘European’. 
Secondly, research needs to delve much deeper into the relationship between changes in the 
EU’s government of inter-firm competition on the one hand and, on the other, developments within 
academic and private consultancy expertise in this subject area. In particular, it needs to discover 
whether at this time the rise within economics of a sub-discipline of competition economics (Lyons, 
2008:8)  was  already  influencing  the  doctrines  of  politicians  and  civil  servants,  perhaps  by 
encouraging a rapprochement between ordoliberals and actors influenced by the Chicago School. 
4. Reinstitutionalization and the victory of Chicago (1997-2003) 
Since the turn of the century EU competition policy has again undergone fundamental change 
and again the relationship between ordoliberals and tenants of the Chicago School have been central 
to this development. However, this relationship transformed during the period 1997-2003 from an 
alliance  against  neo-mercantilism  to  an  intra-neoliberal  conflict  from  which  ‘Chicago’  economic 
doctrine has largely triumphed. Existing analyses of EU competition policy over this period describe 
policy change in detail but tend to understudy or underplay its doctrinal causality and content. 
More precisely, this literature sets out clearly how an institutional order centred upon DG 
Competition, dominated by legal reasoning and operating through a system of a priori notification 
has largely given way to what many commentators see as a decentralized order within ‘economic’ 
                                                      
53 This was the strategy that such actors avowed during our interviews in 1999-2001. 
54 In particular through a series of speeches made at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels. These were subsequently 
brought together as a book (Brittan, 1992). 
55 Speech to CEPS, Brussels, March 1989. 
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analysis and ex post or even private enforcement dominates57. In so doing, three explanations for this 
shift are proposed: 
In keeping with the Commission’s official discourse on this change, firstly a functionalist and 
depoliticized  explanation  in  terms of  ‘administrative  overload’  is  put  forward  (McGowan,  2005). 
According  to  this  line  of  analysis,  in  an  EU  of  27  member  states,  an  ex  ante  notification  and 
authorization system had produced a backlog of cases and delays for firms. Consequently it came to 
be seen as outdated and untenable. Policy change is thus euphemized as ‘modernization’. 
The  second  explanation  of  change  prioritizes  the  role  of  an  ‘epistemic  community’  of 
competition policy specialists as agents of policy innovation. Building upon previous work on this 
‘community’  (Van  Waarden  &  Drahos,  2002),  recent  research  highlights  the  activism  of  certain 
Commission officials58, lawyers59 and shareholder-rights activists60 as both demanding and proposing 
policy change 
Finally, certain specialists of competition policy attribute change to the increased prestige and 
importance given to economics within DG COMP. Wilks in particular not only underlines that the two 
most recent competition commissioners -M. Monti and N. Kroes- are ‘economists’ by training and 
that the former was ‘pivotal’ in ‘the turn to economics’ (2007: 16). He also brings together statistics 
about the number of economists employed by DG COMP (Wilks, 2007: 961). 
If the functionalist explanation for ‘the modernization’ of the EU’s government of inter-firm 
competition merits treating with great caution, the other two sets of actor-centred claims already 
appear convincing. In order to test and push them further, however, our own research will attempts 
to go deeper into the analysis of policy change by discovering links between it and parallel debates 
over the economic doctrine that different actors consider ‘should’ provide EU competition policy 
with its ideological and normative foundations. This perspective is illustrated below first through the 
recent change in the government of anti-trust arrangements and then through that of mergers. 
4.1 The injection of ‘economics’ into the EU government of anti-trust 
In the field of EU action against anti-trust behaviour, most academic attention has thus far 
been focused on describing how officials within DG Competition have proposed, then negotiated 
through  the  Council  and  the  EP,  a  series  of  detailed  legislative  texts  which  have  facilitated 
Commission intervention. In particular, in 2002 a ‘leniency clause’ was introduced which allows the 
Commission  not  to  punish  firms  who  had  provided  information  leading  to  the  successful 
identification  and  prosecution  of  cartels.  This  has  since  sparked  a  programme  of  work  in  the 
                                                      
57 Indeed, as early as 2000 Patrice Geoffron had identified a process wherein ‘without any real debate, a shift took place from a logic of 
regional integration to one according to which competition was promoted because of its supposed virtues in the allocation of resources’ 
(2000: 373). 
58 According to Wigger (2008: 73), conflict within DG IV took a new turn in 2002 when Philip Lowe was imposed as its Director General. This 
British EU civil servant is himself quoted as characterizing DG Comp ‘as ideologically divided in two camps, notably that of the ‘Modernists’ 
and that of ‘Jurassic Park’. The ‘dinosaurs of DG Competition, according to Lowe were those still adhering to the ordoliberal philosophy’. 
59 Wigger and Nölke claim that an enforcement system that encourages litigation coincides with the motivations of the legal profession. 
More exactly, they argue that representatives of both EU and non-EU (notably US) law societies and companies have worked politically 
towards this end: ‘As regular and influential guest at the preparatory stages of the reform, they displayed their expertise in the form of 
lengthy advisory reports to Commission officials and pushed strongly for harmonized rules and private litigation possibilities’ (2007: 504). 
60 Shareholder rights organizations, institutional investors and the financial press are also seen by Wigger and Nölke as promoters of legal 
reform and, in particular, the introduction of class action lawsuits in Europe which, they claim, enable shareholders to influence the 
behaviour of firm management in general, and their approach to mergers and takeovers in particular (2007: 505). Change in the EU’s 
government of mergers and acquisitions is therefore analyzed as overlapping with reforms of the institutions of corporate governance in 
Europe which strengthen  shareholders in their dealings with company  managers. Indeed, Wigger highlights ‘the intimate connection 
between competition policy and corporate governance’ (Wigger, 2007: 98; van Apeldoorn & Horn, 2007; Höpner & Schäfer, 2007). 
61 Wilks underlines that within DG COMP’s total staff of around 700 officials, 134 are ‘economists’ of whom 13 hold Phds. His primary 
source here is the Global Competition Review, 9(7), July 2006 EU Competition Policy Revisited: Economic Doctrines Within European Political Work 
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Commission to encourage ‘whistle blowers’ within specific industries to come forward. This strategy 
appears  to  have  met  with  considerable  success  because,  as  McGovern  underlines,  ‘the  twelve 
highest fines in the history of EC cartel policy were all levied after 2000 and nine of these occurred 
after  200562’  (2007b:  6)63.  However,  such  ‘redescription’  of  change  avoids  the  two-sided  causal 
question of why change in the underlying logic of anti-trust policy occurred during this period and 
who brought it about? A means of answering such questions is to examine when and how the actors 
concerned began to criticize, and more generally conduct political work to deinstitutionalize, the EU’s 
previous approach to antitrust. 
A  first  step  in  this  direction  was  taken  between  1999  and  2002  around  cases  where  the 
European Court of First Instance (CFI) not only reversed the decision of the Commission, but cited 
‘insufficient economic analysis’ as its main reason for doing so64.  Lyons traces the problem here back 
to a change in the Commission’s market definition notice of 1997 and its ‘explicit use of economic 
concepts’ that DG Comp officials proved unable to deal with when preparing decisions on actual 
cases (2008: 15). In particular, this economist identifies ‘a big gap in Commission practice’ due to it 
undertaking ‘no systematic analysis of demand elasticities and cross-elasticities’ (Lyons, 2008: 25). 
A second issue around which systematic criticism of previous Commission practice began to 
develop  concerned  the  identification  and  prosecution  of  ‘vertical  restraints’.  Occasionally  the 
Commission did successfully outlaw such restraints through building cases which relied essentially 
upon formalistic legal reasoning. Following repeated criticism of the Commission by the ECJ, its CFI 
and  representatives  of  business  in  the  mid-1990s  that  the  former  has  too  often  neglected  ‘the 
context’ of inter-firm agreements, a Green Paper on Vertical Restraints was published in 1997 which 
suggested  that  more  ‘economic  analysis’  on  ‘relevant  markets’  be  undertaken  in  the  course  of 
Commission investigations65.  
More  generally,  over  the  years  1997-2003,  the  need  for  ‘economic  analysis’  has  been 
repeatedly invoked not only to deinstitutionalize previous practice by labelling it ‘a problem’, but also 
to reproblematize the Commission’s anti-trust actions as needing to be based upon ‘sound economic 
analysis’. More generally still, this shift was consolidated through an internal review of DG Comp 
undertaken in 2003 that led to a flurry of activity: the following year DG Comp took on a Chief 
Economist66  and  set  up  under  his  authority  an  Economic  Advisory  Group  on  Competition  Policy 
(EAGCP)67; this group then published a report on anti-trust action in 2005 (EAGCP, 2005)68; finally in 
2008 the DG itself published a new set of guidelines which explicitly encourages more ‘economics’ 
and ‘effects-based’ reasoning.  
                                                      
62 In 2007, a case of ‘Elevators and Escalators’ led to the highest fine ever of 992.3 million euros. Other key cases have involved ‘Vitamins’ 
(2001: 790.5 million) and Gas switchgear (2007: 750.7 million).  
63 Indeed, in October 2006 new and tougher guidelines regarding the calculation of these fines for infringements were issued. 
64 Airtours vs Commission (Case T-342/99), Schneider Electric vs Commission (T-310/01) and Tetra Laval vs Commission (T-5/02). According 
to  Wigger  (2008:  260),  this  criticism  of  lack  of  economic  analysis  also  followed  that  made  during  a  number  of  Transatlantic  cases 
concerning Boeing, GE-Honeywell and, subsequently, Microsoft. 
65 This Green Paper was a first step towards a new Vertical Restraints Regulation (2790/1999) set to expire in 2010. 
66 The person occupying this senior post in DG Competition is supposed to provide ‘independent’ expertise and advice, particularly on 
methodological issues. They are also charged with assisting in the development of policy instruments and individual cases involving the 
courts. The first nominee to this post was Lars-Hendrick Röller (presented by Wigger as being from the ‘Chicago school’: 2007, 108). Since 
2006 this post has been held by Professor Damien Neven (Professor of Economics at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in 
Geneva and ex. INSEAD and University of Lausanne). 
67 So far 20 economists from throughout Europe have been members of this group. We are currently undertaking sociographic analysis of 
its membership and their respective approaches to economic analysis. 
68 This report advocates ‘an economic approach to article 82’, ie ‘an effects based’ rather than ‘a form based’ approach (p. 2). In order to 
legitimate this shift, the report invokes in particular the findings of ‘a post-Chicago consensus’ within Economics, the need to make 
consumer protection the key yardstick, ‘competitive harm’ as a key concept, and the virtues of economic modelling. In so doing the report 
caricatures the ‘form based’ approach of previous ordoliberal practice and technicizes concepts of effects, efficiency as being ‘sensible’ and 
therefore value free. EU Competition Policy Revisited: Economic Doctrines Within European Political Work 
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Interestingly, the consumer is frequently invoked in order to legitimate this shift in policy69 - an 
argument from Chicago-School economics that has also frequently been politicized as a means of 
placing ‘cartels’ firmly back near the top of the Commission’s competition agenda. Beginning in 2000 
with speechmaking by Commissioner Monti who labelled cartels as ‘cancers on the open market 
economy’70, then followed up by his successor Neelie Kroes, these representatives of the Commission 
have repeatedly underlined the need for tough action in this area and linked it to more general EU 
goals such as competitiveness, fairness and protection of the consumer71. 
Overall then, anti-trust policy change has been achieved through a combination of constant 
reproblematization  using  detailed  technical  argumentation  taken  mostly  from  Chicago-school 
economics72, but also occasional politicization using rhetoric drawn from the same source. Indeed, 
Wigger  sees  all  these  developments  as  adding  up  to  nothing  less  than  ‘the  vanishing  of  Ordo-
liberalism in one of its last strongholds’ (2007: 108). Rather than simply jump to this conclusion 
ourselves, careful research still needs conducting to ascertain how the shifts sketched out above 
have come about and who has been behind them. 
4.2. A more permissive approach to mergers: from exclusionary to 
exploitative abuse 
A highly similar shift in the Commission’s treatment of mergers has also occurred since the mid 
1990s.  Indeed,  since  the  late  1980s  control  of  mergers  and  acquisitions  on  an  EU  scale  has 
undergone  a  more  or  less  constant  process  of  reinstitutionalization.  Following  an  interim 
amendment of the merger regulation in 1997, the Commission published first a Green then a White 
paper (1999) on how to reform EU policy instruments in this area. This ultimately led to a revised 
Merger  Regulation  (139/2004)  which  modified  the  timetables  for  processing  applications  in 
particular. However, and more importantly still, meanwhile a more general negotiation in the Council 
took  place  that  actually  closed  earlier  by  producing  a  new  Regulation  (1/2003).  By  replacing 
Regulation 17/1962, the latter modifies in particular the enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 of the 
Treaty. Indeed, as all academic competition policy specialists underline, Regulation 1/2003 changes 
not only the logic of merger and takeover control, but also the roles of both the public and private 
actors engaged in this process.  
The most publicly apparent aspect of this change is that since 2004 control has not only been 
conducted  by  the  Commission  (for  all  mergers  which  potentially  affect  trade  between  member 
states), but also by a formalized network of national competition authorities and courts (Ramirez-
Perez  &  Smith,  2009).  But  just  as  importantly  the  system  of  prior  ex  ante  notification  control 
introduced in the early 1960s has been replaced by one of ex post control which deliberately enrols 
the very companies whose behaviour competition policy is supposed to regulate. More precisely, 
since 2004 companies seeking to merge or make takeover bids no longer have to notify and await 
approval by the Commission. Instead, representatives of these companies must themselves assess 
the merger or takeover’s market impact.  
                                                      
69 ‘First, it is competition, and not competitors, that is to be protected. Second, ultimately the aim is to avoid harm to consumers. I like 
aggressive competition –including by dominant companies- and I don’t care if it may hurt competitors, as long as it ultimately benefits 
consumers’. Speech by Neelie Kroes, ‘Preliminary Thoughts on Policy Review of Article 82’, speech delivered to the Fordham Corporate Law 
Institute, New York, 23
rd September, 2005. 
70 Monti M., ‘Fighting Cartels: Why and How?’, speech to the Third Nordic Competition Policy Conference, Stockholm, 11-12 September 
2000. 
71 For instance, Neelie Kroes has repeatedly made speeches that contain statements of the following type: ‘cartels make Europe less 
competitive and put the brakes on our future economic growth. Why invest, why innovate, when you can sit back and profit unfairly from 
an illegally engineered allocation of resources’. ‘Assessment of and Perspectives for Competition Policy in Rome’, speech in Barcelona, 19
th 
November, 2007 (cited in Cini and McGowan, 2009: 63). 
72 It should also be noted that the introduction of leniency clauses in EU legislation is a practice backed up by the post-Chicago consensus of 
economists who use game theory to predict firm behaviour. EU Competition Policy Revisited: Economic Doctrines Within European Political Work 
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Many commentators rightly see this change as a shift in ‘the burden of proof’ (Lehmkuhl, 
2009:  106).  But more  analysis  needs  undertaking  into  a  deeper  shift  in  what  type of  economic 
analysis is to be used as ‘proof’ of an anti-competition merger. Previously this proof involved the 
establishment by DG COMP of ‘a dominance test’ (DT) based on market share. Criticized by Chicago-
school  economists  as  ‘giving  too  much  weight  to  market  shares,  and  so  market  structure,  over 
economic effects’ (Lyons, 2008: 14), as of a Commission Green Paper in 2001, the DT has been 
replaced by a new standard -‘significant impediment to effective competition’ (SIEC)- that is much 
closer to terminology used in US merger policy (Lyons, 2008: 19; Wigger, 2008: 310-11). 
A  second  consequence  of  these  new  rules  on  notification  and  enforcement  has  been  to 
encourage private arbitrations that take place either directly between firms or through a neutral 
mediator. Traditionally most actors within the Commission and the ECJ have been sceptical about 
arbitration. But this position appears to have shifted significantly to one of ‘embrace’: ‘Today the 
Commission not only accepts arbitration in competition matters but also incorporates private dispute 
resolution in its decisions on mergers and acquisitions’ (Lehmkuhl, 2009: 117). 
The effects of these two significant changes to the EU’s government of mergers are obviously 
still  in  the  process  of  stabilizing  and  institutionalizing.  For  example,  according  to  Lyons,  ‘the 
Commission has yet to clarify its attitude to highly sophisticated economic analysis, in particular to 
merger simulation’ (2008: 51). Part of our future research will therefore be concentrated on these 
processes. Just as importantly, however, the causes of change merit much further reflection and 
study. 
Indeed, to conclude provisionally on what we have discovered thus far on recent change in EU 
competition policy, the following three lines of questioning will need to be further developed and 
empirically tested. 
First, although neoliberals have clearly dominated the EU’s government of competition since 
the early 1990s, neo-mercantilists are still very active and often powerful within certain industries, 
such as car-making and retailing (Jullien, 2008), wherein they seek derogations from trans-industry 
rules. Under what conditions can and do neo-mercantilists successfully ‘fight back’? 
Second, amongst the makers of neo-liberal economic doctrine, proponents of Chicago or ‘post-
Chicago’  economics  have  gained  the  upper-hand  over  their  ordoliberal  rivals.  Nevertheless,  as 
evidenced by its continuing differences from US practice, traces of ordoliberalism remain in the way 
inter-firm competition is governed at the scale of the EU (Schweitzer, 2007). What importance should 
one accord to the ordoliberal institutions that remain and who are the actors that continue to defend 
them? 
Finally, research on EU competition policy needs to be extended outside the Commission itself 
to uncover a wider range of political work that, when understood cumulatively, has caused change in 
this mode of government. National competition agencies are obvious objects of study here. But one 
also needs to include representatives of certain firms (or types of firm) and the effects of a general 
rise in the existence and political usage of economic consultancies since the late 1980s (Lyons: 2008). EU Competition Policy Revisited: Economic Doctrines Within European Political Work 
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Conclusion 
More generally, this paper has sought to begin setting out a coherent programme of new 
research based upon a theory-driven revisiting of the whole history of EU competition policy. Our 
approach to this revisit has been inspired by (historical) institutionalism, industrial economics, public 
policy analysis and constructivist political sociology. At this stage it would be presumptuous and risky 
to announce hard and fast conclusions about the added value of this approach. Instead, we want to 
simply underline three of the points made above which will be pursued in the remainder of our 
research. 
First, it is highly important to analyze the content of the economic doctrine used in debates 
over competition policy as well as in its application. Indeed, the very production of this doctrine 
needs more careful analysis which pays particular attention to the mobilization of concepts and 
arguments from the discipline of Economics.  
Second, our approach to the study of EU competition policy also highlights the importance of 
simultaneously  studying  economic  doctrines  and  the  actors  that  develop  and  carry  them  into 
decision-making arenas. Through focusing upon the political work of ‘argumenting’ and alliance-
building  through  which  this  policy  has  been  institutionalized,  the  causes  of  this  process  can  be 
identified with precision. In particular the role played by certain carriers of economic doctrine, eg. 
‘economic consultants’, needs better identification. Just as importantly, such an approach allows one 
to  better  understand  the  reproduction  or  change  of  policy  instruments,  and  thus  of  EU 
governmentality73, that this process has changed.  
This point leads into a more general methodological one concerning the treatment of ‘ideas’ 
by  social  science.  Our  research  to  date  has  born  out  the  need  for  a  second  generation  of 
constructivist scholarship (Parsons, 2007) which refuses to leave analysis of change or reproduction 
of governmentality in the hands of ‘idealists’ who rush too quickly to conclusions about ‘the power of 
ideas’ without retracing precise episodes of political work and ascertaining their respective effects. 
Specifically, although taking the doctrine of ordoliberals highly seriously, we see little evidence to 
support the idea that their approach to competition policy has had hegemonic influence over the 
EU’s  government  of  inter-firm  competition.  Instead,  over  the  course  of  the  last  sixty  years  this 
government has been dominated by doctrines –notably but not exclusively ordoliberalism- and their 
supporters that have differed considerably. By analyzing the role of such doctrines within political 
work, this paper thus sets out an agenda for a constructivist approach to the EU’s government of 
competition that is resolutely historical and sociological.  
                                                      
73 On this point, our approach also leads one to develop research that could feed into actor and even public debate about economic policy. 
The need for more public debate over the doctrines behind the EU’s economic policies in general, and that of competition in particular, has 
been recognized for some time. As Geoffron concluded nearly 10 years ago, ‘Au total, il nous apparaît que la protection du processus 
d’intégration ne peut plus être invoquée au même degré pour défendre la primauté de la politique de la concurrence. (…) la robustesse de 
la dynamique d’intégration ne peut être niée. La politique de la concurrence est en fait désormais un outil au service de la croissance dont 
les bénéficies doivent être comparés avec d’autres outils, dont une politique industrielle européenne plus ambitieuse’ (2000: 380). EU Competition Policy Revisited: Economic Doctrines Within European Political Work 
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